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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL
CATION -

A

LAW -

EQUAL PROTECTION

-

FINANCING PUBLIC EDUREVE-

CHALLENGE TO CALIFORNIA'S ALLOCATION OF EDUCATIONAL

Article IX, section six of the California Constitution provides a well-defined framework for a system of public school financing. Pursuant
to article IX, section six the state legislature has developed a financial structure
within which each school district serves as a focal point for purposes of raising,'
allocating,2 and expending3 educational revenues. The law affords a district great
latitude in establishing its budget requirements4 which may be met through revenues derived from the two basic sources. These basic revenue sources are: (1)
taxes levied upon real property within the district, and (2) aid derived from the
state school fund.5 Under this scheme, the appropriate local governing body
will levy a tax on real property within each district at a rate sufficient to meet
the budget requirements of that district.6 Although the legislature has by statute
established maximum tax rates for the support of public education,7 a district
may by majority vote approve a higher rate,8 thus preserving its budgetary autonomy. Aid from the state school fund is allocated to the school districts in two
principal forms: (1) basic aid which amounts to an unconditional grant of $125
per pupil' and (2) equalization aid which insures each district a basic minimum
revenue per student."0 In addition, a supplementary amount is available to certain districts disadvantaged by virtue of a low assessed valuation of real property
per pupil." For the school year 1968-1969, state aid and local property taxes
accounted for over 90 per cent of California's educational revenues.
During that same year the Baldwin Park Unified School District expended
$577.49 per pupil to educate its children, while the Beverly Hills Unified School
District expended $1231.71 per student. This disparity is hardly unexpected in
light of the tax bases and tax burdens of the two districts. The assessed valuation
per pupil in Baldwin Park was $3,706, while the assessed valuation of Beverly
Hills was $50,885. In 1968"s children attending public schools within Baldwin
Park and their parents brought class actions against certain state and county
officials seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs
sought a declaration that California's school financing scheme violates provisions
of the California Constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Purporting to represent a class of all public school children save
those in the district affording the greatest educational opportunity, the plaintiff
NUES SUSTAINED. -

I See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 20701-20703 (West 1969).
2 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17702 (West 1969).
3 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 20633 (West Supp. 1971).
4 Cf. ch. 784, § 33.5, [1969] Cal. Stat. 1599.
5 See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17300 (West 1969).
6 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 20705 (West 1969).
7 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 20751 (West Supp. 1971).
8

9

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 20803 (West Supp. 1971).
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17751, 17801 (West 1969).
See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17901, 17902 (West 1969); CAL. EDUO. CODE

10
§§ 17654.5,
17655.5, 17656, 17660, 17664, 17665 (West Supp. 1969).
11 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17920 (West Supp. 1971).
12 Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test
for State FinancialStructures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 307 & n.2 (1969).
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children alleged that the financing scheme made the quality of education a function of both a geographical accident and the wealth of their parents and neighbors. Their parents, claiming to represent all parents who have children in the
school system and who pay property taxes in the county of their residence, alleged
that the financing scheme caused them to suffer a higher tax rate than those rates
imposed upon other districts in order to secure equal or lesser educational opportunities for their children. The defendants demurred generally to each claim.
The trial court sustained the demurrers with leave to amend and upon plaintiffs'
failure to do so, granted defendants' motion for dismissal. An appeal was taken
from the order of dismissal. Reversing and remanding with directions to overrule the demurrers as to each claim, the Supreme Court of California held: the
complaint alleged facts sufficient to show that California's public school financing
system denied the plaintiff children "equal protection of the laws because it produces substantial disparities among school districts in the amount of revenue
available for education." Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
I. The Court's Conclusion
In the opening paragraph of its opinion, the court states, "We have concluded, therefore, that such a system [of public school financing] cannot withstand constitutional challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause."'"
How did the court reach this conclusion when faced only with the question of
sufficiency presented by general demurrer? In determining the sufficiency of the
complaint the court judicially noticed a substantial amount of officially reported
data. 4 Apparently the noticed data was enough to convince the court that its
conclusion was sound. Why the court chose to forecast the results of pending
litigation was not made clear. However, for purposes of this comment, it is
enough to note that in general the discussion below will critically survey both the
holding and conclusion.
II.

Adequate State Ground?

The complaint alleged violations of both the state and federal constitutions.
Provisions of the California Constitution specifically relied upon were sections
11 and 21 of article I. Section 11 provides, "All laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation," while section 21 provides in part, "[N]or shall any
citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the
same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." In Department of Mental
Hygiene v. Kirchner,5 the California Supreme Court expressed an "understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and sections 11
and 21 of article I of the California Constitution provide generally equivalent
but independent protections in their respective jurisdictions."'" This expression
was occasioned by a "judgment and mandate" issued by the U.S. Supreme Court
13
14
15

16

Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971).
Id. at 1245, 1246 n.2-6, 1247 n.9, 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605, 606 n.2-6, 607 n.9, 625.
62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).

Id. at 588, 400 P.2d at 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
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which sought clarification of the grounds upon which the California Supreme
Court had struck down a state statute.17 Pursuant to this mandate, the California Supreme Court held it was constrained by the aforementioned sections of the
California Constitution to reach the result that the statute violated principles of
equal protection.'
This holding, of course, precluded review by the high court.
Although in the present opinion, analysis of the complaint was confined to
grounds of federal equal protection, the court noted in passing that its analysis
was applicable to the plaintiffs' claims under sections 11 and 21 .
This remark,
seemingly dispositive of the question of adequate state grounds, merely muddies
the waters. The confusion stems from the court's application of certain principles
of constitutional construction to another of plaintiffs' claims. In rejecting the
plaintiffs' contention that the school financing system violated article IX, section
5 of the California Constitution (directing the Legislature to provide for a system
of common schools), the court said:
While article IX, section 5 makes no reference to school financing, section
6 of that same article specifically authorizes the very element of the fiscal
system of which plaintiffs complain . . . . Elementary principles of construction dictate that where constitutional provisions can reasonably be construed to avoid a conflict, such an interpretation should be adopted ....
If the two provisions were found irreconcilable, section 620 would prevail because it is more specific and was adopted more recently.
What was said here of article IX, section 5 appears equally true of article I, sections 11 and 21.2 In the very least this approach to section 5 casts doubt on
the existence of adequate state grounds. Nevertheless, if after final judgment,
the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari, it is not unforeseeable that the steps of
Kirchner will be retraced. However, the discussion below is confined, as was the
Court's, to the application of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection.
III. Nor Shall Any State... Deny to Any Person Within Its Jurisdiction
the Equal Protection of the Laws
A. The TraditionalApproach
At the core of any equal protection claim is a classification that appears to
affect similarly situated people differently. The traditional approach to a challenged statute requires little more than a rational distinction which serves a
permissible state end. This approach was summarized in McDonald v. Board
of Election Commissioners2 as follows:
17 Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965), vacating 60 Cal. 2d 716,
388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964).
18 Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
19 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 n.11 (1971).
20 Id. at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
21 See CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21, art. IX, § 6 (1879); CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 11, 21,

art. IX, § 6.
22

394 U.S. 802 '(1969).
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The distinctions drawn by the challenged statute must bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the
pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally
even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds
for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications
will be set
23
aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.
Under the traditional approach, ascribing or conjuring a legislative objective
frequently determines the outcome.24 Morey v. Dowd25 provides a clear example
of this process. The Court was faced with an Illinois statute imposing severe
regulations on currency exchanges which issued money orders. The American
Express Company was expressly exempt from the provisions of the act. Arguably,
American Express was in a class by itself; its unquestioned solvency and high
financial standing made regulation of its activities unnecessary." Yet, the Court
perceived in the act's licensing and inspection requirements an intention to
"afford the public continuing protection," an end to which the class of one,
unsusceptible as it was to change in membership, did not conform.27 Recent
approaches to certain equal protection claims, characterized by "strict scrutiny"
depart sharply from the traditional approach, but the search for a legitimate
state end remains a key element of analysis. 8
B. Suspect Classifications
Exacting judicial scrutiny of an equal protection claim is warranted where
the classification is either suspect" or infringes upon a fundamental right. The
classifications which have thus far been regarded as suspect include race and
29 the Court said:
poverty. In McLaughlin v. Florida,
But we deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants,
which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States. This strong policy renders racial
classifications "constitutionally suspect," . . . and subject to the "most rigid
scrutiny," and... "in most circumstances irrelevant" to any constitutionally
acceptable legislative purpose .... 30
There is of course no similar constitutional basis for regarding the impoverished as a suspect class. The view that indigents form a suspect class has
its roots in two important cases dealing with the procedural rights of criminal
23 Id. at 809.
24 See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 810 (1969); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,
466, 467 (1948).
25 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
26 Id. at 464.
27 Id. at 466, 467.
28 See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAuv. L. REv. 1065,
1076-1103 (1969).
29 379 U.S. 184 '(1964).
30 Id. at 191, 192.
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defendants: Griffin v. Ilinois3" and Douglas v. California.2 In Griffin, the Court
ruled that an indigent criminal defendant was denied equal protection when his
right to appellate review was effectively foreclosed by his inability to purchase a
transcript of trial proceedings. 3 The prevailing and concurring opinions appear
to rest on the proposition that the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to providing criminal appellate review."4 Within the prevailing opinion is this statement:
Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our
entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law
is concerned, "stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court."3 5
Douglas, relying on Griffin, said much the same thing of an indigent's ability to
hire an attorney."6 Neither case made mention of strict scrutiny or suspicions
about wealth as a classifying factor.
The first indication that these cases established a general principle concern37
ing wealth discrimination appears in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections
which invalidated Virginia's poll tax. Referring to both Griffin and Douglas, the
Court said, "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property ... are traditionally
disfavored."3 " Many Supreme Court decisions involving discrimination against
indigent defendants followed Harper, but none has mentioned or apparently
relied upon Harper's traditional disfavor.3 9 Despite this silence, Harper's view
emerged as a basis for special scrutiny in McDonald v. State Board of Election
Commissioners" in the following dicta:
And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines
are drawn on the basis of wealth or race. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, . . . two factors which would independently render a classification
highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.
Douglas v. California...
With regard to lines drawn on the basis of wealth, McDonald's thesis is broader
than the cases decided before or after its statement. First, only lines drawn on
the basis of ability to pay have been invalidated. 2 Secondly, the class of indigents
31
32
33

351 U.S. 12 (1956).
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 24 (1956).

34 Id. at 17, 18, 21, 22.
35 Id. at 17.
36 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
37 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
38 Id. at 668.
39 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Williams
v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Swenson
v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).

40 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
41 Id. at 807.
42 See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241,

(1970); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 745 (1967); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259 (1967); Long v. District Court 385
U.S. 192, 194 (1966); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966);
Draper v. Washington 372 U.S. 487, 499, 500 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 482, 483
(1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252. 253 (1959);
Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958).
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has run afoul of the equal protection clause only where inability to pay has
affected the exercise of "fundamental rights." Specifically, the cases have involved a citizen's right to vote and a criminal defendant's rights.43
Examination of Rinaldi v. Yeager," another of Griffin's progeny, will serve
to show the nature of strict scrutiny in the context of criminal justice. The Court
was faced with a New Jersey statute enacted in apparent response to Griffin. A
scheme was devised to enable the state to recover the cost of a free transcript from
the prison earnings of an indigent defendant. 5 However, no provision was made
to collect from other indigents who appealed but who either received a suspended
sentence or were placed on probation.48 The Court applied rigid standards in
examining the distinction between prison inmates and other convicted defendants
as it applied to three asserted state ends: recoupment, administrative convenience,
and deterrence of frivolous appeals. Disregarding the traditional leeway afforded
states to attack only part of a problem, the Court found that the purpose of recoupment was not served because the classification limited recovery to but a segment of those similarly situated."" The administrative convenience in collecting
only from inmates was dismissed as minimal in light of methods readily available
to collect from all convicted appellants.4" With respect to the purpose of deterring
frivolous appeals, the Court said:
By imposing a financial obligation only upon inmates of institutions, the
statute inevitably burdens many whose appeals, though unsuccessful, were
many whose appeals may have been
not frivolous, and
49 leaves untouched
frivolous indeed.
In apparent recognition of the cases which would seem to support the rational relationship of the class of inmates to these state ends," the Court justified
its approach as follows:
This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues
of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these
avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede
open and equal access to the courts (citing inter alia Griffin and Douglas).,"
New Jersey's objective of recoupment might well be reconciled with open
and equal access;2 however, the distinctions designed to serve this end will be
scrutinized for extraneous results which conflict with the fundamental aim of
appellate review, open and equal access. No mention of strict scrutiny was made
in Rinaldi, but the departure from the traditional approach is unmistakable.
43

See cases cited note 42 supra.

44

384 U.S. 305 (1966).

45

Id. at 306.

46 Id. at 308.
47 Id. at 309.
48 Id. at 310.
49 Id.
50 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467, 468 (1948); Roschen v. Ward 279 U.S.
337, 339 (1929).
51 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
52 ld. at 311.
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In the line of cases that runs from Griffin, departures from the traditional approach to equal protection are bound up with precepts of criminal justice. 53 Little
or no support for McDonald's thesis that classification by wealth demands strict
scrutiny can be found in the rationale of these decisions.
Concerning Harper itself, one theme is recurrent,54 "To introduce wealth or
payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor."55 Once this is said, it could little matter that lines
drawn on the basis of wealth were traditionally favored rather than disfavored.
Close scrutiny was applied in Harper, but the Harper Court's reasons do not
reflect the McDonald Court's thesis. Speaking through Justice Douglas, the
Court said:
We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined....
Those principles apply here. For to repeat, wealth or fee paying has, in our
56
view, no relation to voting qualifications ....
In Reynolds v. Sims" (a reapportionment case) the Court said:
Any suggested criteria for the differentiation of citizens are insufficient to
justify any discrimination, as to the weight of their votes, unless relevant to
the permissible purposes of legislative apportionment. Since the achieving
of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim
of legislative apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees the opportunity
for equal participation by all voters in the election
58
of state legislators.

The Harper Court declined to qualify this principle in order to uphold the poll
tax.

59

What was merely implied in Rinaldi was made explicit in Reynolds. Ends
ancillary to the basic aim of affording a fundamental right will be found impermissible to the extent that they may not be reconciled to that aim. The Court
said:
But if, even as a result of a clearly rationalstate policy of according some
legislative representation to political subdivisions, population is submerged

as the controlling consideration in the apportionment of seats in the particular legislative body, then the right of all the State's citizens to cast an
effective and adequately weighted vote would be unconstitutionally im-

paired 0 (emphasis supplied).

53 See Williams v.Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395
U.S. 458, 459 (1969); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 710, 711 (1961); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 33 (1956).
54 But see Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 7,25 (1969).
55 Harper v.Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
56 Id. at 670.
57 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
58 Id. at 565, 566.
59 Harper v.Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
60 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964).
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It is clear from Rinaldi and Reynolds that the process of strict scrutiny is
triggered independently of the presence of a suspect class where open and equal
access to the appellate courts or fair and effective representation is at stake. A
citizen's constitutional protections in the area of state and local elections are
similar in form to those of a criminal defendant in the area of appellate review.
The state may grant or withdraw the franchise or right of appellate review but
once established, lines may not be drawn inconsistent with equal protection.8
C. Fundamental Rights
What does it mean to characterize a right as fundamental under the equal
protection clause? First of all, there is little need for this label where the right is
assured by the Federal Constitution, for infringement of such a right can be dealt
with under the due process clause. 2 If the purpose of this label is to explain the
application of strict scrutiny, then, at least with respect to a citizen's voting rights
and a criminal defendant's procedural rights, the term draws its significance from
the basic63 or central aim6 ' in affording those rights.
A very important opinion has suggested that educational opportunity
possesses the attributes of a fundamental right. In Brown v. Board of Education,5
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms. 68
Of course, this point was made in the context of racial segregation, a constitutionally suspect classification which has been struck down in the context of
relatively trivial interests. 67 Furthermore, the Court based its conclusion on the
importance of education to the individual. Though clearly relevant to toppling
the "separate but equal doctrine," the importance of education may not be
sufficient to afford it special protection outside the area of racial segregation."8
IV. Wealth and Education in California
Plaintiffs, it will be recalled, alleged that "the quality of education for
school age children... [is] a function of the wealth of the children's parents and
neighbors, as measured by the tax base of the school district in which [they]
reside."6 9 Although the amount of property on which an individual parent will
61 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
62 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661, 662 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
63 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565, 566 (1964).
64 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
65 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66 Id. at 493.
67 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), aff'g mem., 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956)
(motorbuses); Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), aff'g mem., 220 F.2d
386 (4th Cir. 1955) (bathhouses).
68 Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Shapiro
v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 661, 662 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 n.1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 n.1 (1971).
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pay taxes would normally reflect his wealth or income, the impact of his tax on
the school district's expenditure per pupil is hardly substantial. It was the wealth
of their neighbors which produced the substantial disparities of which the
plaintiffs complained. The familiar social patterns of rich and poor neighborhoods suggest a close relationship between the wealth of parents and neighbors,
a relationship which zoning serves to shape and harden. However, the sharp
lines of discrimination are obliterated here and there by the presence of commercial property and dense or sparce student populations. Thus, the discrimination presented to the court was very unlike the distinctions based on ability to
pay struck down in previous cases.
The defendants urged that the wealth discrimination was de facto relying
upon parallels easily drawn to de facto racial segregation. In rejecting this contention the court viewed the government's role in establishing the economic
classifications as significant compared with Griffin and Douglas." Precisely why
the unusual extent of the government's activity is relevant is not made clear. In
Griffin and Douglas the state afforded rights which could be effectively exercised
only by those able to pay for a transcript or legal services. Nothing further was
necessary to burden the indigent defendant in his exercise of a fundamental right.
In the present case the government's action in zoning and establishing district
lines created a situation in which a myriad of private factors might operate to
create the resultant geographical disparities. However, the court did not rest its
conclusion and assumed arguendo that the defendants were correct in their contentions. Assuming that the discrimination was de facto, the court observed that
"[a]lthough the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of de facto racial segregation, this court eight years ago held such
segregation invalid....""
In support of their argument that the allegations of the complaint failed to
show discrimination based on wealth, the defendants urged several points. The
conclusions the court reached in discounting these contentions provide a novel
view of wealth discrimination. Defendants first urged that a district's wealth is
not reflected in assessed valuation per pupil because this figure is a function of
the number of students as well as the assessed valuation of property within the
district. Rejecting the notion that total assessed valuation represented the district's
wealth, the court concluded that "the only meaningful measure of a district's
wealth," in the context of school financing, is a ratio of resources to pupils. 2
Secondly, the defendants contended that the disparities in expenditure per student, of which plaintiffs complain, do not reflect the wealth of the various districts
because this figure is a function of tax rate as well as the assessed valuation.
To this the court responded by observing that although a district is able to
determine its expenditure per child by establishing its tax rate, the richer districts
are clearly favored in their ability to achieve the same results with a lower tax
rate. In addition, the court noted that as a statistical matter poor districts are
unable to match the expenditures of wealthier districts.7" Finally, the defendants
70 Id. at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
71
72

Id. at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
Id. at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611.

73 Id.

[Vol. 47 : 6 10]

CASE COMMENTS

argued that the inclusion of commercial property within the tax base renders
assessed valuation per pupil an unreliable index of the wealth of a district's
families. "The simple answer to this argument," said the court, "is that the
plaintiffs have alleged that there is a correlation... .", Of course this simple
answer does not meet the defendants contention that the plaintiffs will have to
prove more than a functional relationship to show discrimination based on wealth.
However, this point was buried as the court proceeded to reject the defendants'
"underlying thesis that classification by wealth is constitutional so long as the
wealth is that of the district, not the individual." 5 The court observed that the
is "the most irrelevant of factors as
uneven distribution of commercial property
76
the basis for educational financing."
The substance of the court's analysis is as follows:
1) Classification of a public school student according to the wealth of his
district is inherently suspect.
2) The only meaningful measure of a district's wealth is the ratio of its
resources to pupils. Thus: Classification of a public school student according to
this ratio is inherently suspect.
This suspicion is not lifted by the fact that a district may compensate by
raising its tax rate because such a procedure favors districts with a high ratio and
as a statistical matter is not sufficient to eliminate some disparities. A district
is favored by a low tax rate but is not necessarily favored by the amount of taxes
paid by its residents. It all amounts to this: The fact that California's school
districts would have to establish widely varying tax rates in order to achieve statewide uniformity in expenditure per pupil is inherently suspect. Only the broadest
reading of the phrase "lines drawn on the basis of wealth" will permit such a conclusion.
It is extraordinarily difficult to conclude, in the absence of evidence of the
composition of the various district tax bases, that the California school financing
system draws lines based on the wealth of individuals. The difficulty would appear to stem from the fact that the system is almost as arbitrary as it is invidious as
viewed by a child of the poor seeking equal educational opportunity.
In reaching its conclusion that education is a fundamental interest that may
not be conditioned upon wealth, the court examined the important role education
plays in affording an individual opportunity for social and economic success
and in molding him into a responsible citizen able to effectively participate on the
political process. In the course of its examination, the court observed that the
importance of education could well be expressed in terms of the rationale offered
in Reynolds v. Sims' to the effect that voting was a fundamental right because
it is a "preservative of other basic civil and political rights. 7 8 Although the
court's approach was oriented to the importance of education to the individual,
its importance to society was stressed time and again. The court apparently concluded that the whole of free public education is a fundamental interest. Specifi74 Id. at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
77 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
78 Id. at 562.
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cally why or how a child's fundamental interest in education exceeds the minimum
assured in California was not addressed. Reasoning by analogy, the court indicated that just as the right to vote means more than the opportunity to cast a
ballot, the right to education means more than access to a classroom. To dilute
the effectiveness of either is to affect a fundamental interest. 9
Having found suspect discrimination in the context of a fundamental
interest, the court said, "We now reach the final step in the application of the
'strict scrutiny' equal protection standard-the determination of whether the California school financing system, as presently structured, is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.""0 In this light the court considered the defendants'
assertion that the state's interest in strengthening and encouraging local responsibility for decision making was served by the present structure of school financing.
The court never reached the question of whether subsidiarity was a compelling
state interest, for in considering the system's effectiveness in achieving this goal,
the court noted that "decentralized financial decision making" is a "cruel illusion
for the poor school districts.""1
V. Conclusion
Two basic steps taken by the court involve a marked development of the
law of equal protection. First, the court found that lines drawn on the basis of a
school district's tax resources were inherently suspect. The suspect classifying
factor was the wealth of a governmental entity and not that of an individual.
Secondly, education was labeled a fundamental interest because of its extreme
importance. No fundamental aim in affording education was discovered or
relied upon. Why does a child's fundamental interest in education exceed the
minimum provided in California? The court's suggested analogy to the impermissibility of diluting the vote provides little support for a similar conclusion as
to education. In Reynolds v. Sims 2 the basic aim of apportionment, "fair and
effective representation," required no less than apportionment on the basis of
population.8" The absence of a fundamental aim in affording education makes
a similar conclusion as to the apportionment of resources to children difficult.
Because the importance of education alone does not lead to a workable conclusion,
the court's finding of a suspect classification is critical to plaintffs' claim for
relief. Why should judicial suspicions determine the outcome of this case? What
is suspect-the motives of the Legislature? The intent of California's system of
school financing appears to be the result of a balancing of competing policiesadequate education and subsidiarity. Labeling a classification as "inherently
suspect" is not a sound basis for constitutional interpretation.
Of all the qualities of education the court observed perhaps one serves best
to support a fundamental aim. The court noted that education is essential to an
individual's ability to compete successfully in our society. Education is a process
79
80
81
82
83

Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-19.
Id. at 1259, 1260; 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619, 620.
Id. at 1260. 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 581.
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that not only nurtures but creates differences in individuals, differences that affect
the progress of their lives in fundamental ways. The state ought to act with an
even hand in this delicate process. To ground a system of public school financing
in a "crazy quilt" of tax resources is to act with other than an even hand. However, the question is not what the state ought to do but rather what the state
may do. The state may balance interests and weigh policies.
To posit a fundamental aim is to limit state alternatives. The equal protection clause can be a powerful tool of reform once values such as "equal justice
under law" or "fair and effective representation" are injected into the process of
evaluation. The values with which the California Supreme Court dealt approach
more closely the domain of ordinary policy than any heretofore incorporated
within the equal protection clause.
Peter E. Nugent
LABOR

AcT--"DuTY

. ..
TO [E]xERT [E]vEY
ACT SECTION 2 FIRST HELD TO
BE JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE BY INJUNTION.'-The conflict between the parties, which began in 1959, concerned the number of brakemen to be employed on
the trains of the Chicago & North Western Railroad. At that time a majority of
the nation's railroads served notice on various unions proposing excess crew members be eliminated at the discretion of management. In response thereto, the
unions served similar notices, as provided for in Railway Labor Act § 6,2 proposing a uniform rule requiring at least two brakemen on every crew. The parties
completed the formal requirements of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) but were
unsuccessful in reaching agreement. In the face of an impending strike, Congress
enacted compulsory arbitration legislation,3 under which Arbitration Board No.
282 was created and national procedures to govern resolution of the controversy
were established. As a result of the Board's award, the Chicago & North Western
agreements permitted the operation of 200 trains with only one brakeman instead
of the usual two."
Cognizant that the award of Board No. 282 was to expire in January,
1966, the Union in July, 1965, served notice requesting return to the requirement of two brakemen per crew. In December, 1965, the Railroad responded by

LAw-RAILwAY

LABOR

[R]EASONABLE [E]FFORT" OF RAILWAY LABOR

1

45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1964) provides:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay,
rules and working conditions, and to settle all disputes whether arising out of the
application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to
commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the
carrier and the employees thereof.
2 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964) provides in part:
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days' written
notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules or working
conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conferences between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon
within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the
thirty days provided in the notice.
3 Brief for petitioner at 7, Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402
U.S. 570 (1971). The legislation created being: Act of Aug. 28, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-108,
77 Stat. 132.
4 Id. at 8.
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serving notices on the Union requesting crew size to be determined by management. Subsequently, after all formal procedures required under the Railway
Labor Act had been exhausted by the parties,5 this suit was brought in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
by C. & N. W. Railway Co. (Railroad) to enjoin a threatened strike by the
United Transportation Union (Union).6 In its pleadings, the Railroad alleged
that although the Union had gone through the formal steps prescribed by the
RLA it had not fulfilled the Act's most critical duty "to exert every reasonable
maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and workeffort to make and
'7
conditions."
ing
The district court deciding in favor of the Union held: (1) Section 2
First, being a matter for administrative determination by the Mediation Board,
was non-justiciable; and, (2) Under provisions of Section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, the district court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the Union
from striking. The district court did, however, grant an injunction against the
strike pending appeal of its decision. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision below by construing
Section 2 First "as a statement of the purpose and policy of the subsequent provisions of the Act and not as a specific requirement anticipating judicial enforcement." '
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed
and held: (1) That Section 2 First created a legal obligation on the parties to
"exert every reasonable effort" to reach agreement; (2) Enforcement was to be
by appropriate judicial means as intended by Congress rather than by the Mediation Board, and ; (3) That Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not
prohibit use of the strike injunction by the district court when it is the only possible, effective means of enforcing the duty imposed by Section 2 First. Chicago
5 Briefly, those requirements are: (1) A party that wishes to change the rate of pay, rules,
or working conditions must give advance written notice. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964); (2) The
parties must confer. Id. § 152 Second; (3) If the conferences fail to resolve the dispute one
or both of the parties may invoke the services of the National Mediation Bcard. which may
initiate its service itself if it finds an emergency to exist. Id. § 155 First; (4) If mediation
fails the Board will attempt to have parties submit to binding arbitration, but this can happen
only upon agreement of both parties. Id. § 157 First; (5) If arbitration is not accepted and
a strike could deprive the public of essential transportation service the President may create
an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. Id. § 160 (The President created
no emergency board in the present case); and, (6) While the dispute is going through these
procedures the parties may not change the status quo. This also applies to a 30-day "cooling
off" period following a refusal to accept binding arbitration. Id. § 155 First, and § 152
Seventh.
6 Chicago & N.W.R Co. v. United Transportation Union, Civil No. 69C2401 (N.D. Ill.,
E.D., Dec. 11, 1969).
7 The complaint as filed with the district court and reprinted in the Appendix to the
decision.
8 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) provides in relevant part:
No Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute.., from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment.
9 Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 422 F.2d 979, 985 (7th Cir.,
1970).
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& North Western Railway Co. v.United TransportationUnion, 402 U.S. 570
(1971).
The Supreme Court decision that Section 2 First imposed a legal obligation
was based on judicial interpretation of the section in earlier cases and on the
legislative history of the RLA. In support of its contention that the writers of
the RLA intended to create a legal obligation, the Court relied solely upon statements made by representatives of the railroads and unions in the House hearings
on the Act." The conclusion of the Court seems unequivocally supported by the
statement of Donald R. Richberg, counsel for the organized railway employees
supporting the bill, when he said:
[I]t is their duty to exert every reasonable effort . .. to settle all disputes,
whether arising out of the abrogation of agreements or otherwise, in order
to avoid any interruption to commerce. In other words, the legal obligation
is imposed, and as I have previously stated, and I want to emphasize it, I
believe that the deliberate violation of that legal obligation could be prevented by court compulsion."
While it is clear (even to those justices dissenting from the majority opinion' 2 )
that it was the understanding of all parties involved that the duty to "exert every
reasonable effort" was judicially enforceable, it is not so clear to what extent
that duty was enforceable. It is the opinion of the dissenting justices that Section
2 First requires only that the parties "recognize one another and sit down to
bargain."13 This proposition finds support in the following statement made
during the hearings by Mr. Richberg:
I think that a duty imposed by law is enforceable by judicial power, yes. Of
course, this is not a duty which could be enforced in a very absolute way,
because it is a duty to exert every reasonable effort. In other words, all that
could be enforced by the Court would be an order against an arbitrary refusal
to even attempt to comply
with that duty, but I do believe that could be
1
subject to judicial power. 4
Earlier in the hearings Mr. Richberg stated:
In the first place, I think if either party showed a willful disregard of the
fundamental requirements, that they should make every reasonable effort to
make an agreement-in other words, if they refuse absolutely to confer, to
meet or discuss or negotiate, I think there is a question as to whether there
might not be invoked some judicial compulsion, but I would rather see that
left to development rather than see it written into the law.' 5
The minority opinion requiring only attendance and recognition for compliance
with Section 2 First is not a fair interpretation of either the words of the statute
10 Hearingson H.R. 7180 Before the House Comm.-on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings].
11 Id. at 91.
12 402 U.S. at 593 (dissenting Opinion).
13 Id. at 599.
14 Hearings at 84-85.
15 Id. at 66.
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or its legislative history. Indeed, it is difficult to conclude that words such as, "It
shall be the duty.., to exert every reasonable effort" could have been intended
by Congress to require only that the parties "recognize one another and sit down
to bargain." It is also difficult to glean the requirement outlined by the dissent
from statements made during the hearings. Mr. Richberg and the majority
agree that an arbitrary refusal to even attempt to comply with Section 2 First
could be subject to judicial power. The majority implies that an arbitrary refusal
to attempt compliance may take more than one form,16 while the dissent contends
that the only form it may take is a refusal "to recognize one another and sit down
to bargain."' 7 The majority interpretation seems to be the much more logical,
and is further supported by Mr. Richberg's explanation as to why the RLA was
lacking in specific regulations and sanctions when he stated:
We believe, and this law has been written upon the theory, that in the
development of the obligations in industrial relations and the law in regard
thereto, there is more danger in attempting to write specific provisions and
penalties into the law than there is in writing the general duties and obligations into the law and letting the enforcement of those duties and obligations develop through the courts in the way in which the common law has
developed in England and America."'
In other words, what was proposed was not a duty susceptible to specific definitions, but was rather a general duty to exert some effort to reach agreement-the
effort required to be developed on a case-by-case basis.
With an eye towards the case law relied upon by the Court to support the
conclusion that Section 2 First imposes a legal obligation, attention is directed
immediately to Virginian Ry. v. Federation.9 Here, plaintiff union, which had
won a representation election, sought judicial assistance when defendant railroad
dealt instead with a "company union." The union claim was based on several
sections of the RLA including Section 2 First.2" The employees were successful
in obtaining an injunction from the trial court directing defendant to "treat with"
the plaintiff union and "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements ..
.""' Defendant railroad appealed the decision contending that
the RLA afforded no legal sanction for that part of the injunction requiring the
railroad to "exert every reasonable effort" to reach an agreement.22 The court,
however, directly rejected that agreement by asserting that neither the words of
the statute nor cases interpreting it lent any support to the contention that Section
2 First was incapable of judicial enforcement.
The Court made very clear its
holding in the following statement:
The statute does not undertake to compel agreement between the employer
and employees, but it does command those preliminary steps without which
16 402 U.S. at 575.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 599.
Hearings at 66.
300 U.S. 515 (1937).
Id. at 538.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 545.
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no agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and
confer with the authorized representative of the employees, to listen to their
complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differences-in short, to
enter into negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as is contemplated by Section 2 First. 4 (Emphasis added.)
The dissent in the present case asserted that the Virginian decision merely
reaffirmed their conclusion that the only legal obligation imposed by Section 2
First was to recognize one another and begin the bargaining process. 2 5

Once

again, it is asserted that the dissent has arrived at its conclusion in an inaccurate
fashion. They have taken one example of the application of Section 2 First,
which required the parties to "treat with" one another, and concluded that this
is the only possible application. Quite the contrary, the court in Virginian stated
that "at least" to the extent used in that case Section 2 First was judicially enforceable. Consequently, the Court did not exclude future enforcement of the
"duty to exert every reasonable effort" in situations where there were recognition
and discussion, but no attempt at agreement.
Furthermore, the Court's statement that Section 2 First requires the parties
to make a "reasonable effort to compose differences" was not merely a passing
reference. The very injunction sustained by the court in Virginian required the
employer not only to "treat with" the union but also to "exert every reasonable
effort to make and maintain agreements."
If there was any doubt after Virginian as to whether a violation of Section
2 First alone could support an injunction its meaning was made more explicit in
8
later cases. In Elgin, I. & E. R. Co. v. Burley9
the Court, in reference to both
Section 2 First and Virginian, stated:
one of the statute's primary commands, judicially enforceable, is found
in the repeated declaration of a duty upon all parties to a dispute to
negotiate for its settlement. (Citations omitted.) This duty is not merely
perfunctory. Good7 faith exhaustion of the possibility of agreement is re...

quired to fulfill it.2

Other cases have reached the same conclusion, 2 and only recently the Court
decided the case of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co. 2 9 which may have been a forecast of the present decision. There in a general discussion of the dispute resolving framework of the RLA the Court referred
to Section 2 First as the heart of the RLA imposing upon management and
24 Id. at 548.
25 402 U.S. at 594.
26 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
27 Id. at 721-22.
28 Those cases supporting the justiciability of Section 2 First are: Stark v. Wickhard, 321
U.S. 288, 306-07 (1944); where the Court cited Virginian for the notion that "where rights
of collective bargaining, created by the same RLA, contained definite prohibitions of conduct,
or were mandatory in form, this Court enforced the rights judicially." In Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 339 (1960), the Court referred to "the Act's command
that employees as well as railroads exert every reasonable effort to settle all disputes." In
Shore Line v. Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969), the Court referred-to the
RLA in this text: "It imposed upon the parties an obligation to make every reasonable effort
to negotiate a settlement. .. ."
29 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
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labor a duty "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
. .in order to avoid any interruption to commerce... .3" While the facts of
the case do not facilitate a comparison of it with the present case it represents a
recent example of the Court's interpretation of the legal obligations imposed by
Section 2 First.
The enforcement of the RLA requirement to "exert every reasonable effort"
has been in the past primarily exercised in cases involving an outright refusal to
bargain, as was evidenced in the Virginian case. In recognizing the legal obligation of Section 2 First, the Court expressly agreed with, and exhibited a willingness to apply, the opinion of a leading commentator:
*

It is not enough for the law to compel the parties to meet and treat without
passing judgment upon the quality of the negotiations. The bargaining
status of a union can be destroyed by going through the motions of negotiating almost as easily as by bluntly withholding recognition. 31
With the decision in the present case the Court has possibly broadened the scope
of the parties' legal obligation under Section 2 First-the extent of which will be
discussed below.
"Given that Section 2 First imposes a legal obligation on the parties, the
question remains whether it is an obligation enforceable by the judiciary." 2 The
Court began its discussion of judicial enforcement from the proposition that the
statutory language and legislative history of the Act were unclear and in such
a case the court had in the past considered three criteria for deciding the propriety
of judicial enforcement. These three criteria are: (1) The importance of the
duty in the scheme of the act; (2) The capacity of the courts to enforce it effectively; and (3) The necessity for judicial enforcement if the right of the aggrieved party is not to prove illusory.3
The attitude of the Court as to the importance of Section 2 First has already
been examined in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co. where it was referred to as "The heart of the Railway Labor Act."34 The
Court further supported its position that a sincere attempt at settlement was
required to give effect to the Act by observing that even if all the formal procedures of the Act were complied with those procedures were "meaningless if
one party goes through the motions with a desire not to reach an agreement." 5
It can be concluded that the Court made the "duty to exert every reasonable
effort" the very essence of the negotiation process, at least to the extent it required
the parties to possess a desire to reach agreement.
The capacity of the courts to effectively enforce the standard of "every reasonable effort" was evidenced in the Virgianian case when the Court noted that
.. whether action taken or omitted is in good faith or reasonable, [is an]

30
31

32
33

Id. at 377-78.

Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 H4Av. L. REv. 1401, 1412-1413 (1958).

402 U.S. at 578.

Id.

34 394 U.S. at 377.
35 402 U.S. at 578.
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everyday subject of inquiry by courts in framing, and enforcing their decrees. '35 It
should also be noted that Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act calls for
judicial decision as to whether plaintiffs have "failed to make every reasonable
effort to settle such dispute.137 The majority being unable to conclude that a
court would be any more capable of enforcing such8 a standard in the case of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act than it would for the RLA.1
The third criterion put forth by the Court was the necessity for judicial enforcement. The court of appeals took the position that the question of fulfilling
the requirement to exert "every reasonable effort" was committed to the National
Mediation Board. 9 In rejecting this proposition the Court looked to the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the RLA.
The original RLA was enacted due to dissatisfaction with the earlier 1920
Transportation Ac' and particularly with the problems surrounding the Railroad Labor Board. This earlier board had been given the authority to make
decisions as to labor disputes, and to direct public criticism against the party
which in its opinion was at fault. 1 The fact that the Board was acting in an
adjudicatory capacity was the main reason that it lost effectiveness in attempting
to settle disputes. During the hearings it was clear that the intention was to
create a National Mediation Board which had no adjudicatory function in order
for it to retain the confidence of both parties.4 2 Recently, the court reached the
same conclusion that "the Mediation Board has no adjudicatory authority with
regard to major disputes.... ""
It is not contended that judicial enforcement of the "duty to exert every
reasonable effort" will not present some difficulties. But judicial enforcement is
necessary if we are to preserve the full effect of the dispute settlement scheme of
the RLA. And as was experienced by the Transportation Act of 1920, the judiciary is the only effective means for that enforcement.
Having established that Section 2 First imposes a legal obligation enforceable by the courts, consideration must be given to the contention that Section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits the use of a strike injunction to compel
compliance with the "duty to exert every reasonable effort."
The Court was brief in its treatment of this issue, relying primarily on their
decision in InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street." This case involved
a request by members of a union to enjoin enforcement of a union-shop agreement entered into under Section 2 Eleventh of the RLA. The agreement required
36
37
38
39
40
41

300 U.S. at 550.
29 U.S.C. § 108 provides in part:
No restraining order or injunction relief shall be granted to any complainant who
has. . ., or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute...
402 U.S. at 579.
422 F.2d at 987.
41 Stat. 456 (1920).
As interpreted by Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72,

79-80 (1923).
Hearings at 18 (Mr. Richberg):
The board of mediation, to preserve its ability to mediate year after year between the
parties, must not be given any. duties to make public reports condemning one party
or the other, even though the board may think one party is wrong.
43 Shore Line v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 158 (1969).
44 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
42
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membership in the union and the payment of various forms of assessments to the
union. The plaintiffs claimed the money was being spent for improper purposes
by the union. In deciding an injunction of a limited nature was consistent with
both the RLA and Norris-LaGuardia Act the Court said:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act.. . expresses a basic policy against the injunction

of activities of labor unions. We have held that the Act does not deprive the
federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with various mandates of
the Railway Labor Act. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S.
515; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338
U.S. 232. However, the policy of the Act suggests that the Courts should
hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy for breaches of duty owing under

the labor
laws unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's
4
right. 5
The Court found it impossible to conclude that no situation could arise where
an injunction "alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right" to have the other
party "exert every reasonable effort" as required of him under Section 2 First.
Therefore, a trial court should be allowed to consider whether there has been a
violation of Section 2 First, and if so, whether an injunction is the only effective
means of enforcing the commands of Section 2 First.
The Court's position was further supported by the congressional debates
over the Norris-LaGuardia Act.4" The remarks of the Senators exhibit that
the Act was not intended to be an absolute prohibition of strike injunctions but
rather would allow injunctions to preserve rights already accrued by the parties
under existing law and to protect the public welfare when endangered by a
strike."'
The Court also noted the fact that Section 2 First was reenacted in 1934,
two years after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and in the event of irreconcilable conflict between their policies, the subsequent, more specific provisions of Section 2
First would prevail under familiar principles of statutory construction."' While
the Court spoke in a positive manner its concluding statement acknowledged
the possibility that there could be another interpretation:
If we have misinterpreted the congressional purpose Congress can remedy
the situation by speaking more clearly. In the meantime we have no choice
45 Id. at 772-73. Other decisions with similar statements are 300 U.S. at 562-63;
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237 (1949);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952).
46 75 CONG. REG. 4938 (1932) (Remarks of Mr. Blaine):
I am quite sure there is no logical argument by which the Senator from Oregon can
construe the provisions of Section 6 to deny the working men any right they may
have under any substantive law, either statutory or courtmade; certainly not with
respect to the substantive law within the Railway Labor Act.
Also, Mr. LaGuardia spoke in response to a question asking if the Act could prevent an injunction of the railroads and thereby stop the public from receiving needed supplies:
We passed the Railway Labor Act, and that takes care of the whole labor situation
pertaining to the railroads. They could not possibly come under this for the reason
that we provided the machinery there for settling labor disputes. 75 CONG. REC.

5499 (1932).
47
48

Id.
402 U.S. at 582-83, n.18; See also 300 U.S. at 563.
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but to trace out as best we may the uncertain line of appropriate accommodations of two statutes with purposes that lead in opposing directions."9
If the Court had decided differently as to the applicability of the NorrisLaGuardia Act it would have frustrated the major purpose of the RLA, which
was to provide a mechanism to avoid strikes. This purpose should not be
frustrated merely because one, or possibly both, of the parties refuse to comply
with the Act. 0
By reaching the conclusion that Section 2 First was judicially enforceable by
injunction, the Court recognized that there may be abuses of this newfound
right to demand the opposing party "exert every reasonable effort." It is feared
that the parties will no longer plan their negotiations around reaching an agreement, but rather will structure their negotiations to comply with the duty to
"exert every reasonable effort." Another difficulty may be that the party who
wishes to retain the status quo, in most cases the railroad, may not wish to compromise during negotiation if he believes the union may be effectively impeded
from resorting to a strike after completion of the formal requirements. 1 Additionally, the Court took cognizance of the possibility that their decision could
result in a "cover for freewheeling judicial interference in labor relations of the
sort that called forth the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the first place."5 " The dissent
goes a little further and states the belief that the decision "will destroy entirely
the carefully planned scheme of the Act."5 " This argument seems invalid. Is it
not looical that enforcement of the duty to "exert every reasonable effort" will
result in a greater willingness to negotiate and promote ultimate agreement, than
would non-enforcement, which would allow willful disregard of the "heart" of
the bargaining mechanism?
It is also believed that if the threat of self-help measures are not felt in the
initial negotiations there will not be sufficient motivation or pressure on the
parties to produce an agreement on their own. The dissent further argues that a
major problem is created by the decision in that it does not provide any rule as
to where the parties are to be remanded in the bargaining scheme. 4 While the
RLA does not include specific regulations and sanctions which would facilitate
enforcement of the Act, it is no less necessary that the provisions be enforced. It
is contended that the problems encountered in enforcement are best handled on
a case-by-case basis. Also it would not be inappropriate to remand the parties
back to the initial steps of the process to start again with a new attitude toward
their negotiations.
In concluding, the Court counseled restraint in the issuance of strike injunctions based on Section 2 First violations. The Court explained its decision
in the following manner:
49 402 U.S. at 582.
50 Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International, 416 F.2d 633, 638 (4th

Cir. 1969).
51 394 U.S. at 380-81.
52 402 U.S. at 583.
53

Id. at 597 (dissenting Opinion).

54 Id.
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...the result reached today is unavoidable if we are to give effect to all our
labor laws---enacted as they were by Congresses of differing political makeup
and differing views on labor relations-rather than restrict our examination
to those pieces of legislation which are in accord with our personal views
of sound labor policy. 5
While it is obvious from the 5-4 decision that equally articulate minds could
reach different conclusions as to the legal issues involved in this case,5" it is
asserted that the Court came to the right conclusion. Upon a close reading of
the case it is obvious the Court placed some restrictions on the use of an injunction in cases of Section 2 First violations. There must be two, and possibly three,
important facts present before a district court may issue an injunction due to
failure to "exert every reasonable effort" to reach agreement. The first and most
difficult requirement to prove is that there has been a failure to exert every
reasonable effort to reach an agreement. The Court cautioned that "great circumspection should be used in going beyond cases involving a desire not to reach
agreement."5 " Thus, the Court seems to have restricted the interpretation of a
failure to "exert every reasonable effort" to something only slightly more than an
overt desire not to reach agreement.58
The second prerequisite is that an injunction will not be ordered unless such
a remedy is the only available means to protect the plaintiff's right to expect the
other party to make a good faith effort to reach agreement."
The final requirement is that there be a danger of irreparable damage to the
public welfare if a strike were to occur. While this requirement is not expressly
stated by the Court, it is implicit from the opinion and has been developed on
remand of the case to the district court. Holding that an injunction be ordered,
the district court said: ". . . this court has the authority to and it is duty bound,
because of certain irreparable damage to the public, to grant an injunction . . . . ,,0
55 Id. at 583-84.
56 This is further supported in a letter to the author from counsel for the respondent, Mr.
John H. Haley, Jr., in which he wrote:
There seems to be general agreement that the dissenting opinion initially was prepared as the majority opinion but that one of the Justices changed his vote while
the case was pending, between the time it was argued on January 18, 1971 and
June 1, when opinions were filed.
57 402 U.S. at 579 n.11.
58 It seems that while the Court warned that utmost care should be used in drawing
parallels between the "good faith" requirement of the N.L.R.A. and the "duty to exert every
reasonable effort" of the RLA, such definitions of requirements of the RLA as in American
Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Inter., 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) may still
hold some vitality:
The requirement of good faith bargaining is really a requirement of absence of bad
faith. In order to show such lack of bad faith it is necessary to establish facts from
which it can be reasonably inferred that a party enters upon a course of bargaining
and oursues it with a desire or intent not to enter into an agreement at all. Id. at 794.
59 402 U.S. at 583.
60 Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 40 U.S.L.W. 2115 (U.S.D.C.
N.D. Ill. 11, 8-13-71). It is interesting to note that the Court also held that:
this Court has the authority . . . to grant an injunction against a strike by
defendant union even though the plaintiff does not come into the Court with clean
hands. The clean hands equity doctrine would apply here except for the grave
and irreparable damages that the public, composed of innocent bystanders, would
suffer.
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By adhering to these prerequisites, the problems considered by both the
majority and dissenting opinions will be minimized. The limited application of
the injunction will not allow parties to plan their negotiations around a hope
that the other party will be enjoined from resorting to self-help because he was
deemed to have failed to "exert every reasonable effort." A real danger of abuse
lies in preliminary injunctions issued prior to decision of a frivolous claim. But
this danger should also be substantially limited by the narrowness of the decision
in the present case coupled with the procedural requirement of a showing that
there is likelihood of success before an injunction will issue.61 Because of the
Court's prerequisites to the use of an injunction, the fear of "freewheeling"
judicial interference in labor negotiations should also prove to be a false fear.
While this decision should promote the possibility of agreement due to the
enforceability of the requirement to exert every reasonable effort during negotiation, in practice, it will not change the present situation. As outlined above, the
three prerequisites to the use of an injunction to enforce Section 2 First are:(1) Failure to "exert every reasonable effort"; (2) injunctive relief being the sole
remedy available; and, (3) potential irreparable damage to the public. Owing
to these requirements it is doubtful that this decision will have any great effect on
strikes in the transportation industry. The parties will still enter negotiations with
a predisposition not conducive to agreement. The railroad's attitude will be a
result of economic pressures and the employees' representative will be attempting
to retain his position as representative by insisting upon a settlement exceeding
that which could be considered fair. 2 The situation will often lead to the case
where the parties complete all the formal requirements with a reasonable effort
to reach agreement and are then able to resort to self-help. It is here that the
RLA has often failed to accomplish its stated objective of avoiding interruptions
in interstate commerce.6" A possible solution would be for Congress to restructure
the responsibilities of the Emergency Board which the President can create per
Section 10 of the RLA.64 If this Board were to have responsibility for determining whether a dispute should be submitted to compulsory arbitration it would be
effective in preventing strikes. In making this decision the Emergency Board
would consider both the impact of a possible strike on the public welfare and the
possibility of a negotiated settlement between the parties without compulsory arbitration. While it is clear that government intervention is inevitable when a strike
threatens the general welfare, the effectiveness of compulsory arbitration will
depend on the fairness and neutrality of the procedures employed. If successful,
compulsory arbitration could result in fair treatment of transportation employees,
and eliminate strikes endangering public health, safety, and welfare.6"
61

Checker Motors Corporation v. Chrysler Corporation, 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
62 Wisehart, Transportation Strike Control Legislation: A Congressional Challenge, 66
Micxi. L. Rav. 1697, 1709 (1968).
63 45 U.S.C. § 151 (a) (1964).
64 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). The President is allowed to create an Emergency Board when
in the opinion of the Mediation Board there is the threat of a strike which would substantially
interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as would deprive a part of the country of
essential transportation service. The Board merely investigates a dispute and reports to the
President regarding such dispute.
65 Wisehart, supra note 62, at 1714-15. For a slightly different approach see Rothman,
National Emergency Disputes Under the LMRA and the RLA, 15 LAB. L.J. 195 (1964).
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While binding arbitration is generally not favored by either party to a dispute the merits of a process free from government interference must be questioned
when the damage to the public due to self-help procedures far outweighs injuries
to the parties. As one commentator so aptly stated:
With the disparity in bargaining power that exists in transportation, muscle
has become the ultimate determinate-at the expense of collective bargaining. The unions argue against compulsory arbitration because they seek to
retain the advantage which their muscle confers. From the standpoint of
the public, however, an assertion that settlements engendered by sheer
muscle are productive of economic wisdom is no less ludicrous than the
medieval assumption that trial by battle was productive of moral wisdom. 6
John E. Oster
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CAUsE.-In 1967, Roosevelt Harris was charged with possession of non-taxpaid
liquor' on the basis of evidence seized in a search of his home and premises. The
search had been carried out pursuant to a warrant supported by a single federal
investigator's affidavit. Prior to trial Harris had moved to suppress the seized
evidence on the ground that the affidavit was inadequate to establish probable
cause for a search, but his motion was denied and he was tried and convicted of
2
the offense.
The controversial affidavit had presented three allegations to the magistrate.
The principal one was that an unidentified informant had reported purchasing
liquor from Harris at his home many times, and had personal knowledge of the
consumption of such liquor in an outbuilding on Harris' premises used as a
"dance hall." Secondly, within the past four years, a local constable had discovered a large quantity of illegal whiskey in a house under Harris' control.
Lastly, Harris had acquired a reputation with the officer as a "bootlegger," based
on the statements of numerous third persons.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction on the
specific ground that the affidavit was insufficient to enable the magistrate to
determine the informant's credibility.' The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 majority,
reversed the court of appeals, reinstated the conviction, and held: in examining
an affidavit based primarily upon the hearsay statements of an anonymous informant to determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, a magistrate may, to substantiate the informant's credibility: (1) consider an allegation of the suspect's criminal reputation as corroboration of the
66

Wisehart, supra note 62, at 1717-18.

1 26 U.S.C. § 5205(a) (2).
2

See United States v. Harris, 412 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1969).

3

Id.
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informant's tip, as long as it is supported by facts indicating past criminal activity
by the suspect, and (2) accord to a statement against the informant's own penal
interest additional credibility sufficient to establish probable cause even without
corroboration. United States v. Harris,403 U.S. 573 (1971).
If a search is sought to be justified by the fact that it was based on a warrant, the essential constitutional requirement for the validity of the warrant is
that it be based upon "probable cause. ' 4 If it is not so based, the evidence seized
in the resulting search is not admissible into evidence at trial.5 The officer seeking
a warrant from a magistrate must submit an affidavit setting forth the grounds
upon which he believes the search justified, from which the magistrate must then
decide whether " 'the facts and circumstances within their [police officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that'
an offense has been or is being committed.""
Thus, probable cause requires the existence of more than a bare suspicion,
but less than would be required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.7 As
a result, not only the quantum but also the mode of proof may be different from
proof at trial; that is, strict rules of admissibility need not be followed by a
magistrate at the probable cause stage. 8 In particular, probable cause can be
predicated upon hearsay as long as there is "a substantial basis" for believing it.9
Beyond those general principles, the issue of what factual showing is necessary for probable cause has been the subject of heated discussion ' when, as in
Harris,the affidavit is based primarily on hearsay. The development of the law
in such an area, where factual appraisals are the central task of the courts, has
necessarily proceeded on an irregular, case-by-case basis; the comparison of cases
is therefore difficult." An examination of past Supreme Court decisions does,
however, reveal that two distinct approaches to probable cause have evolved.
The first of these has attempted to determine probable cause by erecting mechanical tests consisting of various criteria which must be satisfied by the affidavit.'
The second approach has been to read the affidavit as a single unit, weighing
all of the allegations together and deciding whether or not the affidavit as a whole
4

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 The so-called "exclusionary rule" was first applied to the federal courts in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and later extended to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23

(1963).
6 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
7 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
8 Id. at 172-73.
9 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269-71 (1960).
10 The differing viewpoints on this issue will be further developed by the remainder of this
Comment.
11 A court can only make general statements about probable cause, and then examine the
specific facts of the case before it and decide whether probable cause exists. This method of
analysis is occasioned, in part, because probable cause is unique in each case. See 26 LA. L.
REv. 789, 794 (1966).
12 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964).
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justifies a finding of probable cause. 3 The following analysis will focus on both
approaches as they relate to the holding of the Harriscase. The Harris opinion
discloses two distinct areas of departure from prior law: (1) the use of a
suspect's reputation to substantiate and lend credibility to an informer's statements, and (2) the use of the fact that the statements were against the informant's
penal interest to further substantiate his credibility.
I. Reputation as Corroboration of the Informant's Tip
The first issue before the Supreme Court in Harris was whether probable
cause was established by the informant's tip, as supported by the suspect's
alleged reputation and the indication of his past criminal activity. The previous
law in this area was based primarily upon two earlier cases, Aguilar v. Texas4
and Spinelli v. United States.'" In Aguilar a search warrant had been issued
pursuant to an affidavit which stated that "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin" is being kept in the
described apartment. 6 This affidavit was found by the Court to be insufficient.
Reaffirming the earlier cases of Johnson v. United States and Nathanson v.
United States,"8 the Aguilar Court emphasized that it is the role of the magistrate,
not of the police officer, to determine the existence of probable cause. To make
such an independent determination he must be presented with the actual facts
and events from which the officer concluded that a search was justified, and not
merely a statement of the officer's conclusions to that effect. 9 The Court then
propounded its well-known two-pronged test for use in evaluating warrants which
contain an informant's statement. Not only must (1) the facts and sources from
which the informant drew his conclusions be set out, but (2) the affidavit must
also contain the "underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the informant was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'"20 The affidavit in
Aguilar was found to satisfy neither of those requirements. There were no facts
or circumstances whatsoever in the affidavit from which the magistrate could independently evaluate probable cause, only a statement of the officer's conclusion
that the informant was credible and that his information was reliable. Aguilar
was later to be affirmed on its facts, by a plurality in Harris, as requiring that
there be some "underlying facts and circumstances" in an affidavit;2" but the
Harris Court failed to ever explicitly mention the two-pronged test of Aguilar.
In 1969, the Supreme Court undertook to explain the Aguilar rationale in
Spinelli v. United States.22 The affidavit upon which that search was based
13 See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960).
14 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
15 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
16 378 U.S. at 109.
17 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Johnson was one of the first
cases to expressly emphasize the
importance of the magistrate's independent role in determining the existence of probable cause,
rather than his simply acting as rubber stamp. 47 J. URBAN L. 237 (1970).
18 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
19 378 U.S. at 111-13.
20 Id. at 114.
21 403 U.S. at 578.
22 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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related, first, that the FBI "has been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook" by means of two telephones with specified numbers. 23 Second, a five-day surveillance of Spinelli had
revealed that on four of those days he had traveled to the same apartment building in Saint Louis, and on one day was followed to a certain apartment there;
to that apartment were listed, in another name, the telephone numbers recited by
the informant. Third, the affidavit stated that Spinelli was a known bookmaker.2"
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had affirmed Spinelli's conviction
on the ground that, while no one allegation independently established probable
cause, the total effect of all of them was sufficient to do so. 2 ' That determination
was made by reading the affidavit as a whole, without examining each allegation
individually on its own merits.
The Supreme Court rejected such a general approach in favor of "a more
precise analysis." 28 It proceeded to dissect the affidavit and to test the sufficiency
of each allegation. First, the tip was subjected to the two-pronged test of
Aguilar, and failed both parts. It was in fact no more substantial than that in
Aguilar itself; it stated neither the informant's sources nor any facts which would
have indicated that the informant was trustworthy. Only the conclusions of the
affiant officer were set forth.
The Court did not for that reason, however, reject the whole affidavit.
Rather, it elaborated on the Aguilar test by allowing a tip inadequate in itself
to be cured if its information was sufficiently corroborated by other allegations
in the affidavit. The test to be applied in this regard is whether the tip and the
corroboration, together, show both the credibility of the informant and the
dependability of his sources--that is, whether the tip as corroborated is as trustworthy as a tip which alone would pass Aguilar's test.2 7 Each additional allegation was then examined to determine its corroborative value. Spinelli's daily
trips to the apartment were found not to arouse suspicions of criminal activity,
for they could have many legitimate explanations. Likewise, the presence in that
apartment of two telephones with different numbers was held not to be incriminating, that being a rather common "petty luxury." And, quite controversially, even the fact that the numbers of the two telephones were the same as
those divulged by the informant was found not to indicate probable criminal
activity. In particular, it failed to establish that the informant's sources were
have been obtained from an offreliable, for "[t]his meager report could easily
'28
bar.
neighborhood
a
at
heard
hand remark
To justify its decision, the Spinelli Court compared the facts of its case to
those of Draper v. United States. 9 In Draper, a previously reliable informant
had reported that the suspect would be carrying narcotics on one of two specified
trains, and had described in detail the clothes which the suspect would be wearing
and his unusually fast gait. The Court concluded that when the police saw a
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 414.
Id.

Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 880 (8th Cir. 1967).
393 U.S. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 417.
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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man exactly matching the given description emerge from the second named
train, they had probable cause to make a warrantless search and arrest.3 "
As a matter of factual comparison it has been difficult for commentators,
including the present author, to distinguish the two cases. 3 Justices Fortas and
White in their respective opinions in Spinelti had the same difficulty. Particularly
troublesome, as the latter's dissent mentioned, was the fact that all of the corroborated facts in Draper had been innocent ones, not in themselves suggesting
any criminal activity.32 Yet, this lack of suspicion and of suggested criminality
was a major reason for the majority in Spinelli finding the corroboration insufficient in that case. In fact, Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Draper, had
condemned its affidavit for those very reasons in much the same language as that
used by the Spinelli majority. The Spinelli Court required such a high degree
of corroboration that, as a practical matter, it confined the application of Draper
to its exact facts.
Finally, the Spinelli Court dealt with the last allegation-that Spinelli was
a known gambler. Nathanson v. United States34 had determined that an allegation that a suspect had a criminal reputation, standing alone, was not sufficient
to establish probable cause. In Spinelli, the Court went beyond this to hold that
reputation could not be considered at all by the magistrate, not even to add
weight to other allegations in the affidavit.3 5 This was an important limitation, to
again be encountered in Harris.
As a result of its analysis of the allegations, the Court found that probable
cause for a search was not established, neither of Aguilar's prongs having been
satisfied. Probably as interesting as the actual discussion in Spinelli, however,
was the opinion's style and emphasis in dealing with probable cause. The
decision was the high-water mark of an approach to warrants which had been
developing in the earlier cases of Nathanson and Aguilar. Each of these cases
examined warrants with a technical and demanding eye. Each focused on the
idea that the magistrate, not the affiant officer, is the person who must independently determine the existence of probable cause. This attitude led to the
total rejection of conclusory statements and to the erection of mechanical tests for
deciding whether probable cause was present. Nathanson required that the underlying "facts and circumstances" from which the affiant drew his conclusion
be set before the magistrate.3 6 Aguilar further specified that when an informant
is involved the affidavit must state the circumstances which substantiate both the
credibility of the informant and the adequacy of his sources. Spinelli in turn
decreed that corroboration could cure an insufficient tip only if, together, the
tip and the corroborated evidence satisfied both prongs of Aguilar's test. Moreover, Spinelli completely rejected any consideration of allegations concerning
30 Id. at 313.
31 See, e.g., Levinson, Employment of Informant's Statements in Establishing Probable
Cause for Issuance of a Search Warrant, 4 JN. MAR. J. 38, 44 (1970); 83 HAR. L. REV. 7, 180
(1969).
32 393 U.S. at 427.
33 Compare the language of Mr. Justice Douglas, 358 U.S. at 324, with that of the
Spinelli Court, 393 U.S. at 418.
34 290 U.S. 41 (1933).

35

393 U.S. at 417-18.

36

290 U.S. at 47.
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reputation. The result of testing each allegation by the above methods is that
every part of the test must be separately and completely satisfied; an affidavit
weak in any one area of the test will fail even though all other areas are very
strong.
In contrast to those decisions another series of cases has arisen, intertwined
chronologically with the former. These cases-Draper,Jones v. United States,"
and United States v.Ventresca'8 -avoided applying mechanical tests. Instead
they re-emphasized that probable cause is a lighter standard than reasonable
doubt, and that affidavits must be examined in a "practical and realistic"
manner.
i
In Draper, as previously discussed, the facts were arguably distinguishable
from the Spinelli case, as the latter Court contended. Yet, the difference in approach is unmistakable. 9 The Court in Draper did not dissect the affidavit, but
read it as a whole and considered its inferences. There was no trace of the technical attitude later evidenced in Spinelli. This differentiation of the cases probably better explains the difference in their results than does the attempted distinction between the factual situations. Likewise, Jones simply required that there
be "a substantial basis" for crediting hearsay,"' and did not develop a detailed
test along the lines of Aguilar. And lastly, Ventresca, even though it was decided
after Aguilar, did not apply the latter's test. 1 Ventresca, in fact, is probably the
best example of the difference between the two methods of analysis. In that case
the affiant had alleged a long series of suspicious occurrences at a certain
residence. He stated that fellow officers had personally observed a few events,
but he gave no specific source for the others, merely stating at the end of the
affidavit that all of the occurrences had been either observed by the affiant himself
or related to him by fellow officers (but he did not state the source of the officers'
information).
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Ventresca,' 2 examined each alleged
occurrence separately and found the few events stated to have been observed by
the officers insufficient to establish probable cause. He rejected completely the
other allegations because their original sources had not been specifically enumerated and they could have been related to the officers by unreliable informants.,
Therefore, no probable cause existed according to his analysis which closely resembled the method to be used by the majority in Spinelli.
The majority in Ventresca refused to adopt that approach. Reading the
affidavit instead as a whole, they found the fair inference to be that the officers
had made most, if not all, of the observations personally. The Justices concluded
that the affiant's failure to specifically state the source of each occurrence resulted
from carelessness rather than from a deliberate attempt to conceal weak sources.
The majority's decision resulted from its attitude that affidavits should not be
required to meet precise tests, because "[t]hey are normally drafted by nonlawyers
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

362 U.S. 257 (1960).
380 U.S. 102 (1965).
See 10 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 988, 1006 (1969).
362 U.S. at 271.
See 54 CORNELL L. RnV.958, 961 (1969).
380 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 119.
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in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of
elaborate specificity . . . have no proper place in this area."" Rather, the important consideration was the effect which the affidavit had on the Court when
read as a whole.
The Supreme Court has been able to decide each of the above cases without
overruling any previous one; but the decisions obviously do not represent a consistent and unified line of authority. Therefore, Spinelli, the most recent landmark
decision prior to Harris,was not so much an undisputed statement of existing law
as a fragile triumph of one interpretation of probable cause over the other."
Such was the state of the law in June, 1971, when the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Harris. Five Justices found that probable cause was
established by the disputed affidavit, but that majority differed among itself as to
the reason. The most detailed opinion, written by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, gave
two reasons for the decision. First, without overruling any previous decisions he
determined that the corroboration of the informant's tip had cured it of any
possible defects; second, he held that the tip alone established probable cause
because the informant had made statements against his penal interest. Justices
Blackmun and Black concurred in the opinion for both of the above reasons, with
the addition that the former Justice would have explicitly overruled Spinelli, and
the latter would have overruled both Spinelli and Aguilar.
Providing an early indication of its tenor, the Burger opinion began the
evaluation of the affidavit by quoting from Ventresca the reminder that warrants must be considered in a "commonsense and realistic fashion."' O Next, the
opinion admitted that some facts and circumstances, and not merely the affiant's
conclusions, must be submitted to the magistrate; but it did not mention the
Aguilar-Spinelli test, or indeed any test.47 Then, the Chief Justice turned his attention to the three allegations of the affidavit: the informant's statement that
he had purchased whiskey from the defendant, the earlier discovery of contraband
liquor on the defendant's property, and the criminal reputation of the defendant.
The dispute, as the Burger opinion mentioned, concerned the credibility of the
informant-had the allegations created a sufficient probability that the informant
was telling the truth?
Initially, the opinion looked to the corroboration of the tip in search of
indicia of credibility. The facts were compared to those of Jones, mentioned
above; the Chief Justice declaring that case to be a "suitable benchmark" for
"determining what quantum of information is necessary to support a belief that
an unidentified informant's information is truthful."4
In Jones, the informant
told the affiant officer that he had made numerous purchases of narcotics from
the suspect in a specific apartment. Had this been the only allegation in the of44 Id. at 108.
45 The majority in Sp~inelli was 5-3, with Mr. Justice White concurring "[Plending fullscale reconsideration of [Draper] on the one hand, or of the Nathanson-Aguilar cases on the
other..., especially since a vote to affirm would produce an equally divided court." 393 U.S.
at 429.
46 403 U.S. at 577 (quoting 380 U.S. at 108).
47 Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, on the other hand, began in true Spinelli
fashion by stating the rule of that case and then discussing each of its parts in turn.
48 403 U.S. at 580.
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ficer's affidavit, "it might not have been enough."49 But in addition, the officer
alleged three facts tending to corroborate the informant's story: the informant
had previously given accurate information; his story was corroborated by statements of other unknown sources; and the suspect was a known and admitted
narcotics user." The Burger opinion in Harrisfound these facts to be very close
to those of the instant case; particularly noteworthy were the two latter allegations. Just as the first of those was essentially that Jones had a reputation for
selling narcotics, so Harris was a reputed "bootlegger." And just as Jones had in
the past admitted to being a narcotics addict, so whiskey had earlier been found
on Harris' property. That is, both cases contained a fact indicating that the
defendant had previously been involved in the same criminal activity.
The Court, in Spinelli, had said that reputation could not be considered at
all by the magistrate. The Chief Justice proceeded, in Harris, to distinguish that
case on the ground that it contained no factual indication of past criminal activities on the defendant's part. Then, using Jones as precedent, the Chief Justice held that when a criminal reputation is "supported" by such factual statements indicating prior criminal conduct, the reputation can be considered along
with the other allegations. 5
Is this factual distinction between Harrisand Spinelli a bona fide one? The
reasoning of the majority in Spinelli would certainly not recognize it.5 2

The

whole thrust of that opinion was that an alleged reputation may not be "used
to give additional weight to allegations which would otherwise be insufficient."5 "
From such a viewpoint an allegation of reputation is simply a conclusion drawn
from several hearsay statements made to the affiant 4 And like all hearsay,
Spinelli would consider it only if the source of each statement and the credibility
of each speaker could be demonstrated. The other allegation, that of past criminal activity by the suspect, would in no way cure either of those defects in the
statement of reputation; therefore, the latter could not be considered at all. By
admitting such evidence of reputation for the magistrate's consideration, Mr.
Chief Justice Burger in effect held that as long as the affidavit contains some
facts, not only the facts but also the conclusions contained therein can be considered. Such a conclusion would be repugnant to Spinelli; therefore Justices
Burger and Stewart appear to have distinguished Spinelli on a very technical
aspect.
They did recognize the inconsistency in the theory of the two cases, however, as evidenced by their clear condemnation of the above Spinelli reasoning
as it might apply to future cases. They said that "to the extent that Spinelli prohibits the use of such probative information, it has no support in our prior cases,
logic, or experience and we decline to apply it to preclude a magistrate from relying on a law enforcement officer's knowledge of a suspect's reputation."' 55 Jus49 362 U.S. at 271.
50 Id.
51 403 U.S. at 581.
52 In fact, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Harris totally rejected the distinction, calling it
"a make-weight intended to avoid the necessity of calling for an outright overruling of
Spinelli." 403 U.S. at 596.

53

393 U.S. at 418-19.

54
55

403 U.S. at 598 (Harlan J., dissenting).
Id. at 583.
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tices Blackmun and Black took a somewhat firmer position by urging the outright
overruling of Spinelli.
Although Jones thus proved to be a helpful precedent for finding that corroborated reputation could be considered by a magistrate, the further question
remained of whether, even considering reputation, the allegations in Harriswere
as substantial as those in Jones. They were in fact very similar, except that
Jones contained the additional allegation that the informant had been previously
reliable. Was this difference a crucial one? The Burger opinion, four Justices
concurring, found that the previous reliability had not been regarded as essential
in Jones. On the other hand, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent contended that that
specific allegation had been relied upon at least to the same extent as the others.
In fact, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Jones was inconclusive
on the issue, for that Court did not have to decide it. Still, it should be noted
that a statement of past reliability is always very strong evidence of credibility
and has, in at least one instance, been held sufficient in itself to prove trustworthiness."' The Burger plurality, therefore, by finding credibility to be established
without past reliability, has certainly established a factual precedent more liberal
than that of Jones.
In summary, the first part of the Burger opinion moved from the precedent
of Spinelli both in spirit and in specific holding and resurrected the practical attitude embodied in Ventresca. No mechanical tests of any type were used to separate the allegations and examine them individually. Even more significantly,
the admission of the suspect's reputation diluted a fundamental tenet of Johnson,
Spinelli and Aguilar, for an allegation of reputation is basically a conclusion of
the affiant officer from various unrevealed sources. The magistrate, in evaluating
a reputation, must base his decision not upon facts but upon his assessment of the
officer's judgment. Such an evaluation is no longer "independent" on the part
of the magistrate.
II.

Statements Against Penal Interest

The Harris informant, in relating that he had purchased "illicit whiskey"
from Harris, in effect admitted major elements of the crime of purchase and possession of nontaxpaid liquor under the Internal Revenue Code.5" Four Justices,"8
concurring in the second part of Mr. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, decided
that because the hearsay statement was against the declarant's penal interests
it was sufficiently credible to establish probable cause, even apart from the previously discussed corroboration of the tip. Analogizing from an exception to the
hearsay rule of evidence, they reasoned that no one would make such a statement against his interest unless it were true.5" If someone were going to fabricate
a story, he would create one which included no criminal conduct on his own
part rather than intimate himself.
This reliance upon hearsay statements made against one's penal interest is
56
57
58
59

Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
26 U.S.C. § 5205(a) (2).
Mr. Chief justice Burger and Justices Black, Blackmun and White.
See 403 U.S. at 583, 584.
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novel in the area of probable cause. The Supreme Court had never before even
alluded to it as a basis for credibility, 0 and the prosecution had not raised the
issue in its brief in Harris.6' There is, however, a long history sanctioning the
use of such statements as evidence at trial. This basic exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence is that hearsay statements against the declarant's interest
may be admitted.6 2 The present rule in the federal courts and in most states,
however, is that only statements against a declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interests, and not those against his penal interest, are admissible.6"
Mr. Chief Justice Burger noted that no reason existed for this distinction
between types of interest, a distinction which has been criticized within the Supreme Court itself since its adoption," and widely condemned by commentators. 5
Moreover, the present judicial trend is clearly in favor of admitting statements
against penal interest66 and such statements are admissible under the Uniform
Rules of Evidence,6" the Model Rules of Evidence, 68 and, in part, under the more
recent Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence." However, nowhere in Harriswas it
pointed out that the cases, commentary and Proposed Rules all limit admissibility
to hearsay statements which exculpate the accused. In fact, the Proposed Rules
specifically exclude the admission of "a statement or confession... made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused." 70 Most informants' tips against their own penal interests will necessarily be of the latter
type, for the only usefulness of such disclosures lies in their implication of the
defendant. Moreover, the rationale behind the exclusion of such statements at
trial is not that they would violate the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment-a rationale inappropriate to ex parte warrant hearings.7 Rather, it is
simply that they are especially unreliable due to the "readily supposed advantages
[to the declarant] of implicating another" to share the blame with him."2
Admittedly, both the cases and the Proposed Rules deal with evidence at
the trial stage where the standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) is much
greater than the probable cause required for a warrant. Consequently, some
evidence excludible at trial might properly be considered in evaluating probable
cause. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has consistently held that even the latter
60 This issue has, however, been a minor point in the decisions of two state courts of last
resort; Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 176 S.E.2d 309 (1970); People v. Montague,
19 N.Y.2d 121, 224 N.E.2d 873, 278 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1967).
61 See the statement of Mr. Justice Harlan at 403 U.S. 594.
62 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 253-57 (1954); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1455-77 (3d ed. 1940).
63 5 J. WIGMORE, supra 6 1476.
64 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243, 277 (1913).
65 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 61, §§ 1476-77.
66 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970);
People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 '(1964).
67 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENcE, rule 63 (1953).
68 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 509 (1942).
69 PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES
(Revised Draft), rule 8-04(b) (4) (1971) [hereafter cited as P.F.R.E.].
70 Id.
71 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86
(1970).
72 P.F.R.E., rule 8-04(b) (4), Advisory Committee's Note at 130.
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standard requires more than mere unsubstantiated hearsay.7" Mr. Justice White
in his dissent in Bruton v. United States noted that: "Due to his strong motivation
to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements
about what the defendant . . . did are less credible than ordinary hearsay.""
Practically speaking, therefore, to the extent that an informant's interests resemble
those of a codefendant at trial it appears that his statements are insufficient to
establish even probable cause.
Essentially, the issue becomes that of whether the informant, like a codefendant, had interests which he was protecting by his statement greater than
those which he sacrificed in confessing and implicating the defendant. If he
volunteered his confession at a time when the police did not suspect him of a
crime, or had little or no evidence against him, then he was obviously acting
against his penal interest. But if he had, for example, been apprehended with
the contraband whiskey in his possession and it appeared that he would be prosecuted, the situation would be entirely different. He might then well expect
that his lot would be an easier one if he cooperated and revealed to the police
the identity of his supplier. His position would be such that his penal interests
in fact dictate that he confess, and the credibility of his statement would be correspondingly weakened. This is the type of situation contemplated by the exclusionary rule in the Proposed Rules and by Mr. Justice White in Bruton. The
Burger plurality, however, made no mention of the fact that, for all the affidavit
had revealed, this could well have been the situation in Harris.
As Mr. Justice Harlan emphasized in his dissent, the uncertainty over an informant's credibility is compounded when he is promised immunity from prosecution in return for his statement.7 5 The Chief Justice, on the other hand,
concluded that such immunity would still not remove "the residual risk . . . of
having admitted criminal conduct."76 True, this risk may be a deterrent to false
admissions to some extent, but only if the informant is in a situation with no
existing evidence against him. In the other case, where the informant is caught
red-handed and is about to be charged with a crime, there is little such risk. On
the contrary, with the promise of immunity the informant can now see not only
a vague chance that things might go better for him if he cooperates, but a definite assurance to that effect. The informant thus has much to gain and little
to lose by making his implicating admissions, his statement being against his
penal interest only in the most technical sense.
Clearly, therefore, not all criminal admissions by informants are in reality
statements against their penal interest. It is true that the Chief Justice, who
early in his opinion emphasized a practical approach to evaluating warrants, did
not in fact here contend that every admission by an informant would establish
probable cause. Yet, he elaborated no criteria for distinguishing between situations, and gave little guidance to magistrates for their future probable cause rulings. Even more importantly, one must question his conclusion that, on the
73
time.
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This principle was established in Jones and has been consistently followed since that
391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968).
403 U.S. at 595.
Id. at 584.
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facts of Harris, probable cause was established by the admission. The Harris
informant could very well have been in the second situation above, and in effect
been advancing rather than impeding his penal interest by his statement. Although Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that the affiant should be required to prove
that the informant had not been granted immunity, it has just been demonstrated
that immunity is not the crucial consideration; it is whether the informant was
in fact harming and not advancing his true penal interest by his statement.
Future magistrates, when scanning the Harris decision for judicial guidance,
will find very little of practical value; for on each of the two issues of the case
the Court was evenly split, one justice withholding comment. In a case in which
only one of the two issues arose, the affidavit might well be rejected. Furthermore, in examining the importance of statements against penal interest the Court
has entered a new and undefined area, the exact contours of which must await
future decisions.
What does emerge from the decision, though, is an indication that the lenient
attitude evidenced in Jones and Ventresca has not been extinguished by Spinelli,
and that conflict between the two lines of analysis will continue to make the proof
of probable cause for warrant issuance one of the most controversial areas of
contemporary criminal jurisprudence.
James J. Cunningham
SEARCH AND SEIZURE DUE PROCESS PREHEARING SEIZURE UNDER CALIFORNIA'S CLAIM AND DELIVERY LAW Is AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WrITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Pursuant to section
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

526a of the California Code of Civil Procedure,' plaintiffs instituted a taxpayers'
suit seeking injunctive relief to prevent the illegal expenditure of public funds.

The plaintiff-taxpayers2 contended that the expenditure of time and money by
the sheriff of the County of Los Angeles in enforcing the provisions of the 1872
Claim and Delivery Law' amounted to an illegal use of public resources, since
the provisions of that statute violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 13 and 19 of the California
Constitution. The Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the requested injunc1

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West Supp. 1971).

2 The plaintiffs have not sustained direct harm by enforcement of the Claim and Delivery
Law against themselves. Rather, they challenge it as taxpayers. Several declarations were
offered by the plaintiffs on behalf of persons whose property was in fact seized; however, none
of the declarants are involved in the controversy.
3 CAL. CIV. PRoo. CODE §§ 509-521 (West 1954):
§ 509. Claims for delivery; time

Delivery of Personal Property, When It May Be Claimed. The plaintiff in an action
to recover the possession of personal property may, at the time of issuing the summons, or at any time before answer, claim the delivery of such property to him as
provided in this Chapter....
§ 517. Property concealed in building or enclosure; demand; breaking building to
effect seizure

If the property, or any part thereof, be in a building or enclosure, the sheriff,
constable, or marshal must publicly demand its delivery. If it be not delivered, he
must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open, and take the property into
his possession; and, if necessary, he may call to his aid the power of his county.....
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tive relief." The court of appeals reversed the judgment on the grounds that no
case or controversy existed, so that any opinion rendered would essentially be
advisory.' In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of California sustained
the action of the trial court, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, and
held: civil intrusions in execution of claim and delivery are searches and seizures
that are prima facie unreasonable, unless supported by a warrant based on probable cause; and, the auxiliary remedy of claim and delivery is a taking of property without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, and thus violates the
requirements of procedural due process. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." ' Due to an unfortunate dictum in an early case that the fourth amendment "has no reference to civil proceedings for the recovery of debts,"' courts in
the past have been reluctant to extend its protections beyond the criminal sphere.8
Paradoxically, the development of case law in the criminal context, which afforded greater protection against the waiver or negation of fourth amendment rights,'
gave new impetus to the argument that these protections should be expanded to
cover civil cases."0 The growing concern to protect "the enclave of private life,""
lent credence to the contention that the civil-criminal dichotomy was a "fantastic absurdity.""
Finally, the viability of that bifurcation was called into question as a result
4 Blair v. Pitchess, No. 942, 966 Cal. Super. Ct., May 12, 1969, (final order entered,
Nov. 25, 1969).
5 Blair v. Pitchess, 12 Cal. App. 3d 981, 91 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970), vacated, Blair v.
Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486, P.2d 1242 (1971).
6 U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
7 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 285
(1855).
8 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959) held that fourth amendment protections
were peripheral in civil inspections carried out to enforce fire, health and housing codes. Despite Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement in behalf of the majority that the primary purpose of
the inspections was corrective rather than punitive, the latter was the result if entry was denied.
Id. at 362. See Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), aff'g per curiam by an equally divided
Court State v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), petition for rehearing denied,
364 U.S. 855 (1959).
9 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610 (1961); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.

383 (1914).
10 Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.); District of Columbia v. Little, 178
F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other giounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
11 Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MicH. L. REv. 219, 229 (1965)
discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbral right of privacy).
12 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (warrantless Health Department Inspection and subsequent conviction invalid), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1
(1950). Judge Prettyman stated: "[T]he common-law right of a man to privacy in his home
• . . is one of the . . . essentials of our concept of civilization. . . . To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against [the] search of his home without a warrant,
but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity." Id. at
16-17.
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of Camara v. Municipal Court.1" There, the United States Supreme Court, in
overruling an earlier decision," issued a writ of prohibition barring prosecution
of the appellant, who had refused to permit a warrantless inspection of his personal residence to enforce a municipal housing code. Absent consent from the
owner of the house, the Court required that a warrant be issued if probable
cause exists. However, on the consent issue the Court was quite equivocal and
indecisive, for it stated that "it seems likely that warrants should normally be
sought only after entry is refused." The reasonableness of the probable cause
standards was to vary with "'the nature of the search being sought,' "'" but certainly would be less strict than the proper test in criminal cases. In a companion
case, See v. City of Seattle," the Court extended its reasoning to cover inspections of non-public areas of commercial premises which may ultimately result in
punitive measures for violations. Unfortunately, the See case threw more confusion than light on the issue of consent because of its inconsistent language.
While apparently standing by the Camara standard (warrant required only
where refusal to permit entry), the Court went on to state that warrantless
searches are "presumptively unreasonable,"'" a standard which would arguably
place the burden on the administrative official to obtain a warrant in all cases
or show exceptional circumstances for dispensing with the requirement. Both
cases appear to stand for the proposition that administrative searches require the
same "traditional safeguards" as do searches to ferret out crime.' 8
Whether that statement of these cases is too comprehensive is a question that
has aroused numerous speculations.' 9 Several points remain unclear as a result
of Camara and See taken together: (1) Is the extension of fourth amendment
protections to civil cases limited only to those situations in which a criminal prosecution may result from a denial of entry? (2) To what extent does consent
vitiate the need for probable cause in conducting an administrative search?
Wyman v. James answered the first question in the affirmative." That case
arose when a New York state recipient of Aid For Dependent Children (AFDC)
refused to permit a home visitation as a prerequisite to receiving public assistance
under the New York Social Services Law, and its implementing regulations.2'
Appellee instituted a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that
the proposed visit by a welfare worker was a search, and must therefore be predicated upon consent, or a warrant based on probable cause. A divided threejudge district court, relying on Camara and See, ruled that the statutes were un13 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
14 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
15 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967), quoting from Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
16 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
17 Id. at 543. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Clark argues that the result of the decision will
be the issuance of "boxcar warrants," which will render the fourth amendment meaningless.
Id. at 554.
18 Id. at 534.
19 Blabey, See and Camara: Their Far-ReachingEffect on State Regulatory Activities and
the Origin of the Civil Warrant in New York, 33 ALBANY L. Rav. 64, 69 (1968); Comment,
47 NEB. L. REv. 613, 627 (1968); Comment, 3 HIAv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. IaB. L. Iv. 209, 216

(1967).
20 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
21 N.Y. SOCIAL SERVICES

LAw

§ 134 (McKinney 1954).
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constitutional, and the Supreme Court reversed. 2 In holding that there was no
search, and even if there were, it was not unreasonable,2" the Court was unwilling
to require the warrant protection outside "a criminal context where a genuine
search was denied and prosecution followed. ' 24 Camara and See followed that
pattern, and so were "not inconsistent.125 Significant also was the fact that the
visitations were for rehabilitative and beneficent purposes.2
The recipient could
refuse entry and not fear penal action. To do so would simply jeopardize her
qualifications for benefits.2
The Wyman Court accepts the Camara-See extension of fourth amendment protections, but delimits a broad interpretation of
those rights by refusing to enter the civil-criminal dichotomy. The Court indicates that there is no need to eradicate the above distinction; rather, it retains it
by merely shifting the line of demarcation, marking off a quasi-criminal area
which requires protection, and thereby appearing to deplete the non-protected
"civil" area. As a result of this line of reasoning, Wyman obfuscates the search
and probable cause aspects of the case, and makes the consequence of refusal, i.e.,
criminal prosecution, the controlling factor in determining whether constitutional
guidelines should apply to the intrusion. 8
It is against this background that the fourth amendment issue arises in
Blair.2" This case converges more sharply on the two questions posed above.
For example, is the Court unqualifiedly correct in stating that the teaching of
Camara,See and Wyman is that "the Fourth Amendment applies to civil as well
as criminal matters"?"' The above discussion requires a negative answer, since
Wyman underscored the fact that Camara and See arose in the "criminal law
context."'" Compelled to distinguish Wyman, since that case appears to impose
restrictions on an extension of the Camara rationale, the Blair court does so by
pointing to the benefit to the person whose home is invaded, and the lack of
criminal sanctions in the Wyman case. 2 The court concludes that the operation
of section 517-permitting the breaking of buildings to effect seizure, if necessary,
with the power of the county-is "clearly a search within the meaning of the
22 James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd sub nom., Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
23 400 U.S. at 318-19.
24 Id. at 325.
25 Id. at 324-25.
26 As Mr. Justice Brandeis has so wisely stated: "Experience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
27 In a vigorous dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Douglas argues that this amounts to "buying up" rights guaranteed under the Constitution. 400 U.S. at 328. Or, as Justice Marshall
points out in his dissent, the effect is to impose economic sanctions on the exercise of a constitutional prerogative. Id. at 340.
28 Cf. Comment, 51 BOSTON U. L. REv. 154, (1971): ...
[Wyman] carves a limitation
upon the applicability of the fourth amendment in noncriminal situations and represents a
reversal of the trend toward greater fourth-amendment protection in cases involving involuntary searches." Id. at 157. Compare Comment, 19 KAN. L. REv. 486 (1971) with Comment,
40 U. CIN. L. REv. 157 (1971).
29 There is no concrete factual pattern per se here. Rather, the court is dealing abstractly
with the operation of an entire statute which circumscribes a particular governmental action.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30 96 Cal. Rptr. at 52, 486 P.2d at 1252.
31 400 U.S. at 317.
32 96 Cal. Rptr. at 52, 486 P.2d at 1252.
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Fourth Amendment.""a Since the sheriff is empowered to enter premises and
seize property "with the full force of the law" 4 should the replevin-defendant
refuse delivery of the property, section 517 plainly falls within the "criminal context." Indeed, section 148 of the California Penal Code prescribes'sanctions for
resisting, delaying, or obstructing "any public officer, in the discharge or attempt
to discharge any duty of his office." 3'
Forced by Wyman to play the civil-criminal game, the Blair court safely meets that test. At first glance then, Blair appears
to make the extension of fourth amendment protections to civil cases contingent
upon whether criminal sanctions may result from a refusal to permit entry. If
that is so, then the statement in Blair that fourth amendment protections apply
to civil as well as criminal matters must be qualified and modified by the requirement of possible subsequent sanctions, however superfluous this requirement.
On the other hand, it may be that the language Blair uses in interpreting
Camara,See and Wyman is a direct result of its proceeding beyond the artificial
dichotomy, and resting its analysis on a more fundamental basis: Blair presents
the proper set of circumstances for determining whether a genuine search (and
seizure) was conducted, to which probable cause standards would be applicable;8 in addition, assuming there is an invasion, does consent operate as an
effective waiver of constitutionally guaranteed protections? To be rather pithy,
the reliance on the criminal-civil argument, while admittedly helpful in invalidating the statute, adds nothing new or interesting; the importance of Blair is its
focus on consent.
In response to the latter question posed above, the court resolves the apparent inconsistency between the language of Camara and See regarding consent, by opting for a presumption of non-waiverability of fourth amendment protections in claim and delivery cases.3 ' In so deciding, the court goes far beyond
the Camarastandard of requiring a warrant in lieu of inability to obtain consent,
and emphatically recognizes the realities of the replevin situation. The court
demonstrates a strong preference for a warrant in a replevin action. Citing "the
intimidating presence of an officer of the law," as well as "legal process which
appears to justify the intrusion," the court concludes that consent to search in
these circumstances can hardly be voluntary. 8 Nor will adhesion sales contracts,
which allow entry by the creditor, operate as effective waivers.3 9
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 CAL. P-NAL CODF § 148 (West 1970).
36 Perhaps a much clearer case is presented here than in Camara, See and Wyman since
§ 517 permits a seizure, which goes beyond the search situation, and would justify more stringent probable cause requirements. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
37 96 Cal. Rptr. at 54, 486 P.2d at 1254. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938), citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937): "...
we 'do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.'"
38 96 Cal. Rptr. at 54, 486 P.2d at 1254. In a case involving early morning raids to determine welfare eligibility (in which appellant refused to participate, and was thus relieved of his
job), the Supreme Court of California noted that "[tjhe request for entry by persons whom
the beneficiaries knew to possess virtually unlimited power over their very livelihood posed a
threat which was far more certain, immediate, and substantial. These circumstances nullify
the legal effectiveness of the apparent consent. . . ." Parrish v. Civil Service Com'n of County
of Alameda, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629-30, 426 P.2d 223, 229-30 (1967).
39 96 Cal. Rptr. at 54, 486 P.2d at 1254. See, .e.g., Williams v. General Elec. Corp., 159
Cal. App. 2d 527, 323 P.2d 1046 (1958).
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The Blair case becomes further complicated (yet more significant) with
respect to consent, in light of Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Company0 and
conflicting decisions from other jurisdictions." Laprease provides a factual setting illustrating the operation of the New York replevin statute,42 which is substantially similar to the Califoniia statute. The plaintiff, Mrs. Laprease, in a
consolidated action, sought to enjoin the defendant Marshal from enforcing the
New York replevin law. The defendant furniture company (plaintiff in the
replevin action) had delivered an affadavit, requisition, undertaking, summons
and complaint to the Marshal for the City of Syracuse, New York, requiring the
seizure of a bed, dinette set, and other household furnishings. The Marshal advised Mrs. Laprease that ". . . if she did not release [the articles] a forcible entry
into her apartment would be made."4
Mrs. Laprease stated that her husband
was ill, that she had ten children, and was living on public welfare. She alleged
that if the statute were to be enforced, she would be in "immediate danger" of
(1) a taking of her property without due process of law, and (2) an illegal search
and seizure. In a unanimous opinion rendered by Judge Port, the three-judge
District Court for the Northern District of New York held that, following the
Camara and See rationale, the fourth amendment acts as a "shield" in civil matters, and here especially, since criminal sanctions would follow resistance to seizure.4 Following the See language, the court held that a search without a war'
rant in the replevin situation is "presumptively unreasonable."45
Conflicting with the Laprease holding is a case decided one month later in
a Florida district court, Fuentes v. Faircloth," presently docketed before the Supreme Court. There, the plaintiff had purchased a gas stove and stereo set under
a conditional sales contract. The purchaser defaulted on the payments. Upon
the request of the vendor, the small claims court issued a writ of replevin, and
commanded the sheriff to execute it. The deputy sheriff waited on the front
porch with two employees from the vendor's company, until the plaintiff's son-inlaw, Mr. Leon, returned. At first, Mr. Leon refused to give up the property,
informing the officers that his attorney had advised that a court hearing was
necessary. After the sheriff explained that the writ required the property to be
yielded, Mr. Leon submitted to the repossession. The divided three-judge district
court, while admitting that the "plaintiff was reluctant to allow the entry," held,
inter alia, that the section of the replevin statute authorizing forcible entry with
40 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
41 See Brunswick Corporation v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Wheeler v.
Adams Company, 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954
(S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971), presently docketed and argued sub
nom., Fuentes v. Shevin, 40 U.S.L.W. 3233 (1971), summarized, 39 U.S.L.W. 3406 (1970)
(No. 70-5039).
42 N. Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7101 et seq. (McKinney 1963).
43 315 F. Supp. at 719.
44 N. Y. PENAL CODE § 195.05 (McKinney 1954) provides for sanctions for obstructing
governmental administration. Florida has a similar provision for resisting an officer without
violence to his person. FLA. STAT. ANN. 44, § 843.02 (Supp. 1971-72). In addition, the
replevin-defendant may be held in contempt for attempting to conceal the property. FLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 78.071 (Supp. 1971-72).
See supra note 35 and accompanying text for
California provision.
45 315 F. Supp. at 721.
46 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
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"the power of the County" was not an issue, since there was not a forcible entry."
As to the issue of consent and waiverability, the court said that "the conditional
sales contract in the instant case is dispositive of the Fourth Amendment ques'
tion."48
The fact of default under the conditional sales contract provided the
vendor with the requisite consent to enter and repossess the goods "at its option." 9 The court likewise ruled against the purchaser on the due process question. Interestingly enough, the court cited the lower court decision in Blair, but
disagreed with it to the extent that it conflicted."
The Blair court refuses to allow waiverability of fourth amendment rights
in a Fuentes factual pattern. Significantly, Blair ignores the less demanding
Camara test for probable cause (warrant only after failure to obtain consent),
and instead chooses the "presumptively unreasonable" standard."' Why does
the court adopt such a stringent standard, which is normally exacted in the criminal sphere?5" The absolutist language is a recognition that consent to an invasion can never be unequivocal when a person is confronted with equally obnoxious alternatives. Forced to choose between permitting entry, thereby waiving a
constitutional prerogative, or refusing entry, thus risking criminal sanctions as
well as forcible entry, most replevin defendants are likely to comply with the
stark representation of legal sanction and compulsion, i.e., the sheriff. The effect
of the sheriff's request to permit entry is to say: "Allow us to do what we shall
proceed to do, in any event." This is nothing more than a Hobson's choice. As
Mr. Justice Jackson noted in his dissenting opinion in Brinegarv. United States:"
"The citizen's choice is quietly to submit to whatever the officers undertake or to
resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence." Absent extremely exceptional or
critical circumstances, a warrantless search should be considered unreasonable,
and deserves disapprobation and censure, since ".

.

. [t]here is no way in which

the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection." Only the warrant procedure can offer that constitutional protection-it is presumably indispensable, and
any other method should be viewed with extreme circumspection.
An analogy to the presumption against waiverability in criminal cases is
particularly apt-: just as "[ilt is incredible that [the defendant] would have voluntarily consented to a search which he knew would disclose incriminating evidence,"" it is quite as preposterous that a replevin-defendant would gleefully
acquiesce in the expropriation of the very necessities of his everyday life. And
47 Id. at 957-58.
48 Id. at 958.
49 Id. at 956.
50 Id. at 959.
51 Note, 19 KAN. L. Rav. 281, 287 (1971).
52 See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925): "The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws." Id. at 32. The
presumption theory normally rests on a totality of circumstances test. E.g., United States v.
Shropshire, 271 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1967): "Considering the totality of circumstances
under which [defendant] signed the consent to search form, this Court concludes that the consent to search was not freely and voluntarily given and thus could not validate the ensuing
search." Id. at 523. See also Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United
States v. Slusser, 270 F. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1921); United States v. Marquette, 271 F. 120
(N.D. Cal. 1920).
53 338 U.S. 160. 182 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
54 United States v. Shropshire, 271 F. Supp. 521, 524 (E.D. La. 1967). See also Higgins
v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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certainly the innocent citizen is entitled, at a minimum, to the same protections
as a person suspected of a crime."
By referring to "the intimidating presence of an officer of the law, . . .
[and] the existence of legal process which appears to justify the intrusion,"" the
court intimates that the presumption against waiver functions almost like a per se
rule. Indicative of the court's disposition on the waiver matter is its abstract
consideration and invalidation of the entire statute, rather than waiting until the
case arises within a particular factual framework. "In such a situation acquiescence to the intrusion cannot operate as a voluntary waiver of Fourth Amendment rights."57 Additionally, the Blair court notes that absence of a warning of
the occupant's right to deny entry will not per se render consent ineffective, but
will act as an indication that consent was not voluntary. However, in a replevin
requisition, any warning would be nugatory and contradictory, since the owner is
prohibited by the statute from refusing entry.5" As was wisely explained in another case involving consent: ". . . [T]he circumstances of the defendant's plight
may be such as to make any claim of consent 'not in accordance with human
experience,' and explainable only on the basis of 'physical or moral compulsion.' "59
Such is the case under the replevin framework. The abstract consideration
in Blair reaches absurd proportions under the factual conditions of the Fuentes
case. There, as was noted above, entry was denied on the advice of Mr. Leon's
attorney. But, upon explanation by the Sheriff that he was compelled to execute
the writ, Mr. Leon agreed to the repossession. The court, admitting that such
consent was reluctant, and despite Mrs. Fuentes claim of a meritorious defense,
still refused to countenance that the entry was forced. In a short dissenting
opinion, Judge Eaton, while arguing that the issue of forcible entry was before
the court, focused on due process as the predominant consideration in a replevin
action:
When the state authorizes the forcible entry of a person's house prior
to the establishment of the probable validity of a creditor's claim, it con0
travenes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.G

55 A blatant disregard for citizens' rights has produced some of the grosser violations of
the fourth amendment. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (warrantless
community search of innocent citizens' homes for suspected police slayers) and Parrish v.
Civil Service Com'n of County of Alameda, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d
223 (1967) (warrantless early morning raids to determine welfare eligibility).
56
96 Cal. Rptr. at 54, 486 P.2d at 1254.
57 Id. The balancing test which the court employs clearly comes down hard in favor of
"these important individual rights against the less compelling state interests." Id. at 53, 486
P.2d at 1253.
58 Id. at 54, 486 P.2d at 1254 n.8. In an application of the exclusionary rule to a search by
inspectors for the Food and Drug Administration, the defendants challenged their conviction
on the grounds that their consent to the inspection was invalid, since they had not been warned
of their right under Camara and See to insist upon a warrant. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument, and held that there was a clear manifestation of consent to search, and no force or
misrepresentation on the part of the inspectors. United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d
1006 (9th Cir. 1970). See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
59 Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951), citing Ray v. United
States, 84 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1936).
60 317 F. Supp. at 959 (dissenting opinion).
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Furthermore, the conditional sales contract was not dispositive of the due process
right, by operating as an effective waiver of that right. Judge Eaton's legitimate
concern for the due process claim is illuminating in that it hints at the correlation
between the stricter consent and probable cause standards on one hand, and the
procedural due process demands on the other.
It has been suggested that the absolute language on the search and seizure
issue in Laprease (by analogy, to the Blair case) was necessary because that case
dealt with an express due process question resulting from a pretrial search and
seizure, while Camara and See were cases dealing only with a search.
Since notice and hearing are required, a warrantless search, though possible,
would be inconsistent with the requirements of the due process clause. If
a court determines in a pretrial hearing that a creditor may seize the personal property of the debtor, it naturally follows that there would be probable cause to seize the chattel. 61
The Blair court will absolutely not permit fourth amendment protections to be
waived if the result is that due process rights will also be invaded.
Analogous to the correlation here of the fourth and fourteenth amendments
is the case Boyd v. United States.62 Finding an "intimate relation" between the
fourth and fifth amendments, the Supreme Court held that, a civil forfeiture
proceeding takes on criminal aspects, so that the seizure of a person's papers for
use in evidence against him is unreasonable; in effect, it is not ". . . substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself." 63 Likewise, in a
replevin action the fourth and fourteenth amendments "run almost into each
4
other."G
Blair fails to articulate the inherent interrelatedness of these two distinct
rights in the replevin situation, and thus leaves unanswered the question whether
a judicial hearing on the due process issue suffices to establish probable cause or
a waiver of fourth amendment protections in the event of an adverse ruling.
However, the court does say that
...in order to create a constitutional replevin remedy, there must be provision for a determination of probable cause by a magistrate and for a hearing prior to any seizure.. 6- (emphasis added).
This statement does not mean that separate dual procedures are necessary. Rather, the court is indicating that the new requirement of probable cause and a warrant, is not alone sufficient to establish a constitutional replevin remedy. In addition, due process is a constitutional prerequisite: prior notice and hearing are
mandated.
While Blair is perplexing by its silence on the possible integral features of
61 Note, 19 KAN. L. Rv.281, 287 '(1971).
62 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
63 Id. at 633. But see generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), which discredits
the "mere evidence" rule of Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and also seems to
undermine Boyd somewhat.
64 116 U.S. at 630.
65 96 Cal. Rptr. at 60, 486 P.2d at 1260.
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these provisos, it does offer elucidation, which serves to clarify some of the ambiguity and confusion generated by Laprease. For instance, Laprease would countenance (albeit it prefers prior notice and hearing) an ex parte order based on
probable cause as a minimum guarantee in replevin actions, provided that the
creditor demonstrates that justifiably exceptional circumstances exist."6 However, the appropriate circumstances are not specified. The narrow exceptions to
the due process demands, and the appropriate probable cause criteria are described more definitively by the Blair court. Carefully limited instances may
exist in which "a summary procedure may be consonant with constitutional principles": (1) Where there is a danger the property will be destroyed; or, (2)
Where there is a likelihood that the debtor will abscond, preventing the state
from exercising its jurisdiction.67 These limitations should be narrowly construed,
and the burden is placed on the creditor, for it is difficult to conceive how the
due process imperatives of prior notice and hearing comport with allowance of
an uncontested judicial proceeding. Absent these unique circumstances, notice
and a hearing are "essential prerequisites."6 Effective notice calculated to reach
the replevin-defendant is a sine qua non; otherwise, the opportunity to be heard
is aborted and subverted.6 9
In addition, four basic tests are suggested,7 if the replevin-plaintiff (creditor) is to satisfy the probable cause and specificity standards of the fourth amendment: 1) The creditor must allege that he owns property which the defendant
is wrongfully detaining (obviously, this entails the determination of whose
property, and necessarily generates a due process issue); (2) Underlying facts
must be set forth by the creditor, showing reasons to believe that such allegations are true; (3) The creditor must present facts showing probable cause to
believe the property is actually at the location specified in the requisition; and
(4) A neutral magistrate must pass upon the allegations. In light of these
criteria, the "presumptively unreasonable" standard of Blair manifests itself. In
claim and delivery actions there is an "obvious taking," both in the sense of a
genuine search and seizure, and in the sense of deprivation of property. Due
process "takes priority,"7 1 and is afforded deserved protection through the fourth
amendment standards revealed in Blair.
The genesis of the due process argument in the Blair case is found in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,7 in which the United States Supreme Court
struck down the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment proceeding. That statute
permitted one-half of an employee's wages to be frozen, and allowed the creditor
66 315 F. Supp. at 723-25.
67 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57, 486 P.2d at 1257.
68 Note, 19 KAN. L. REV. 281, 287 (1971).
69 Id. at 288-89. For hearing requirements see Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914): "The fundamental requisite of due process is the
opportunity to be heard." Id. at 394. The constitutional prerogative of a hearing was first
established in Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863). For notice requirements and a
recognition that notice affects the opportunity to be heard, see Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (notice by publication insufficient for due process purposes when possible to notify party through mail); and,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
70 96 Cal. Rptr. at 53, 486 P.2d at 1253.
71 Note, 19 KAN. L. REv. 281, 291 (1971).
72 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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ten days to issue a summons and complaint upon the debtor, after service on the
garnishee."' The Supreme Court held that, without notice and a prior hearing,
this procedure "violates the fundamental principles of due process.""4 The Court
stressed the hardship and severity imposed by such a process,"' but utilized an
unfortunate phrase to make its point: "We deal here with wages-a specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system."" Mr.
Justice Harlan concurred in the Court's opinion, but explained that the property
of which the petitioner was deprived was the use of the garnished wages pending
final judgment, a deprivation which "cannot be characterized as de minimis.!"
The distinction between the type of property and the use of property is vital. For
it is on the basis of the type of property involved in Sniadach,that it is most often
distinguished from other cases, a hurdle which the court in Blair must overcome.
Several courts have endeavored to limit the vitality of the Sniadach case by
refusing to amplify its holding. For example, in Brunswick Corporationv. J & P,
Inc.," the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was faced with
a due process attack on the Oklahoma replevin statute7 9 in a diversity action.
Brunswick had sold bowling equipment under a conditional sales contract. After
Brunswick filed for replevin and bond, the United States Marshal took possession
of the equipment by removing vital parts, thus rendering the machinery inoperative. He then delivered constructive possession to Brunswick, who sold the
goods at a public auction before judgment. The court found that a due process
objection was inappropriate, since Sniadach (which was relied upon by the
replevin-defendant) involved "a specialized type of property," and was "not in
the least comparable to the case here on appeal involving enforcement of a
security interest."'
As was discussed above, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida has reached an identical conclusion in the Fuentes case.
Although other jurisdictions have also limited Sniadach by allowing replevin of
household goods purchased under conditional sales contracts,8' 1 and peaceful
repossession of a financed automobile,82 the Sniadach language does not set up
an insuperable barrier to the type of decision reached in Blair.
Indeed, there is ample support for the extension of the Sniadach rationale
beyond the garnishment area.8" As was noted above, the Laprease case struck
down a replevin procedure almost identical to the one involved in Blair. The
73 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.01 et seq. (Supp. 1971-72).
74 395 U.S. at 342.
75 Id. at 340. Mr. Justice Black, on the other hand, argues that concepts of fairness and
decency - a so-called "shock-the-conscience" test - results in a natural law theory, leaving
to judges to decide what is fair, based on their own arbitrary whims and caprices. Id. at 35051 (addendum to dissenting opinion).
76 Id. at 340.
77 Id. at 342 (concurring opinion).
78 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
79 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1571 et seq. (1961).
80 424 F.2d at 105.
81 Wheeler v. Adams Company, 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971).
82 McCormick v. First National Bank of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
83 At least two state courts have determined that constitutional prerequisites are not limited
solely to garnishment of wages, but extend to cover garnishment of other types of property. Cf.
Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970)
(garnishment of accounts receivable); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20
(1969) (all prejudgment garnishments unconstitutional).
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court in Laprease stressed not so much the type of property involved, as the
hardship involved in the deprivation of use and enjoyment of household goods,
even if only a temporary taking.8 4 Other courts have, through extrapolation,
applied Sniadach to broader contexts. For instance, the deprivation is even more
drastic in the case of an imposition of an innkeeper's lien upon a boarder; for,
in that situation, all the tenant's belongings are locked in his room." Similarly,
the issuance of a writ of immediate possession prior to a hearing on the merits in
an unlawful detainer action is violative of due process. In such circumstances,
the right of a tenant to the continued use of his rented property is a substantial and valuable right and until it has been judicially determined that
such right has been forfeited . . . , the right is entitled to judicial protection. 6
Perhaps the coup de grace to the judicial limitation of Sniadach to a
"specialized type of property," is Goldberg v. Kelly. 7 There, the Supreme Court
determined that the termination of federally financed Aid For Dependent
Children (AFDC) and aid administered under the New York State Home
Relief Program (which "benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement" )8 required prior notice and a hearing to satisfy the protections of due process of law.
The Court did not require a full-blown judicial or quasi-judicial hearing, but
merely prescribed that the recipient be afforded an "opportunity to be heard."
Unless "overwhelming considerations" demand it, the termination of aid "in the
face of... 'brutal need' ... is unconscionable," without due process of law." It
would appear then, that there are "no cogent reasons" for limiting Sniadach
standards to cases involving only wage garnishments. 90
By quoting with approval Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Sniadach, the Blair court recognizes that it is not the type of property that is
determinative of a due process violation, but rather, whether there has been an
obvious taking resulting in loss of use of property. "... [T]he right to be heard
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, ... [provides] those
essential safeguards for fair judgment which in the course of centuries have come
to be associated with due process."" The claim and delivery seizure and taking
"... violates due process if it occurs prior to a hearing on the merits unless
justified by weighty state or creditor interests.""2 Neither eventual retrieval of the
merchandise nor a surety bond serves to abate the loss of use of the goods pending
final judgment. " It is this vital concern which compelled Justice Harlan to condude in Sniadach:
84 315 F. Supp. at 723. See generally Griggs v. Alleghany County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962)
(temporary taking is a violation of due process).
85 Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
86 Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 484, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20 (1970).

87

397 U.S. 254 (1970).

88 Id. at 262.
89 Id. at 261, aff'g sub nom. and citing Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893. 900 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
90 Comment, 34 ALBANY L. RaV. 426, 431 (1970).
91 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
92 96 Cal. Rptr. at 56, 486 P.2d at 1256.
93 Id.
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I think that due process is afforded only by the kinds of "notice" and
"hearing" which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the
probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before
he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use."
The logical extension of this pronouncement is found in the substantiality and
vitality of the stringent standards of Blair-this is the court's foremost concern
in considering the replevin framework.
The ratio decidendi of Blair thus provides potent authority for a clarification
of the troublesome language of Camara, See and Sniadach, and the resultant
disharmony in the state and federal courts in replevin cases. Hopefully, the
progeny of those three cases will be reconciled, if and when the Supreme Court
decides Fuentes on the merits. At least, Blair provides the wherewithal to render
a sound decision on the consent issue by focusing on whether there is a genuine
search which requires fourth amendment guarantees of protection. In addition,
the case implicitly raises the problem of whether the constitutionally protected
right of probable cause has an inherently concommitant relationship to the expanding notions of due process of law in the replevin situation.
It is time to abandon draconian approaches, to recognize the clear realities
of the replevin operation, and to decide that merely because a dubious practice
'
has the "blessing of age,"95
is not alone sufficient to render it constitutionally
permissible today.
Edward M. Smith

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIALS A JURY
TRIAL Is NOT REQUIRED IN A STATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATIVE
HEARING UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.-The juveniles in this appeal were arrested and charged with delinquency
in the state juvenile courts of North Carolina and Pennsylvania. Prior to each

hearing, counsel for the juvenile made a timely request for a jury trial. These
requests were subsequently denied by the trial judges. The delinquency declaration in each case was dependent upon a factual determination that the youth
committed an act which, but for the age of the defendant, would have been
punishable as a crime.' On appeal in the appropriate state courts the appellants
each contended, inter alia, that the failure to honor the request for a jury trial
was violative of the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.2 The state supreme courts affirmed based on a finding that the leading
case of In re Gault3 did not require that all adult due process rights be applied to
the juvenile proceedings.' Further, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania specifi94
95
1
2

395 U.S. at 343.
315 F. Supp. at 723.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-277-8 '(1969); PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 11 § 243(4) (a) (1939).
McKeiver Appeal, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 760 (1970); Terry Appeal, 215 Pa. Super. Ct.
762 (1970); In re Burrus, 4 N.C. App. 523 (1969), 167 S.E.2d 454 (1969); In re Shelton,
5 N.C. App. 487, 168 S.E.2d 695 (1969).
3 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4 Terry Appeal, 438 Pa. 339, 255 A.2d 921 (1970); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169
S.E.2d 879 (1969).
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cally found that there were certain beneficial elements in the juvenile system
which were sufficient to render the jury right less essential to the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. These factors included: (1) the different conception held
by the juvenile judge of his role in the hearings as opposed to his criminal court
counterpart, (2) the greater availability of rehabilitative and diagnostic services
and (3) the fact that a declaration of delinquency does not carry with it the
social stigma and civil liabilities normally associated with a finding of criminal
guilt.' The United States Supreme Court heard arguments solely on the question
of the jury right. The Court affirmed and held: A trial by jury is not constitutionally required in the adjudicatory phase of a state juvenile court delinquency
proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
The belief that minors should be accorded special treatment in the courts
was well developed, both in the civil and common law, before the American
Revolution. It was generally recognized that nonage might be a defense to a
misdemeanor or felony, although the age of accountability varied. As a rule
a child between the ages of seven and fourteen would be dealt with as an adult
only if it was shown that he knew right from wrong. Children younger than
seven were deemed incapable of having the requisite intent to commit a crime
and therefore to be punished.6 Infants were also entitled to special treatment
under the equitable doctrine of parens patriae. The Crown was under an obligation to protect the interests of those subjects who could not do so for themselves.
This protection was extended to the feebleminded, to the insane and to minors
when their parents were either unwilling or unable to perform their obligations.7
In the United States these concepts were, for the most part, accepted with little
variation. In the 1870's reformers succeeded in having adopted limited procedural and institutional modifications in the criminal courts. These reforms
were aimed at isolating the juvenile offender from adult criminals.'
Major
changes in this area did not occur until 1899 when Illinois passed the first comprehensive juvenile court statute in this country.'
The Illinois law, as well as the subsequent statutes patterned on it, was a
hybrid of the criminal and equitable concepts outlined above. The new juvenile
court system required taking the juvenile offender out of the adult process,
focusing society's attention upon discovering why he was engaged in deviant
behavior and attempting to correct any aberrations in his background in order
to terminate his budding criminal career."0 Judge Julian Mack aptly summarized
the feelings of those involved in the new system:
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal;
to save it from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life;
to take it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing it and then reforming it,
to protect it from the stigma... Proceedings are brought to have a guardian
5 Terry Appeal, 438 Pa. at 355, 255 A.2d at 930.
6 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22-24.
7 Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (1722); The PRESIDENT'S
LAw

ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, 2-3 (1967) [Hereinafter
8 TASK FORCE REPORT 2-3.

9

10

TASK

FORCE

referred to as TASK

Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (repealed 1965).

Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909).
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or representative of the state appointed to look after the child, to have the
state intervene between the natural parent and the child because the child
needs it, as evidenced by some of its acts, and because the parent is either
unwilling or unable to train the child properly. 1
The statutes, which were passed in order to effectuate this ideal, faced stiff
constitutional challenges in the state courts. These attacks centered upon the failure to include in the juvenile system the protections accorded an adult in a
criminal proceeding. In deciding those cases the courts adopted the position that
the protections typified by the provisions of the sixth and seventh amendments
were limited to criminal trials.1 2 The juvenile trials were exempted on the basis
that they were "civil in nature,"'8 "statutory,"' 4 "quasi-criminal"' 15 or even "sui
generis.""' In each instance, the benevolent motive expressed by the supporters
of the system persuaded the justices that the youth was not being subjected to the
criminal process. Judge Brown of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a
rather extreme view in this regard which was, nonetheless, in line with the other
courts. He felt that the state is not required:
when compelled as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for the
same purpose [that is, to correct misconduct on the part of the minor and
provide the necessary guidance] to adopt any process as a means of placing
its hands upon the child to lead it into one of its courts."7
In the 1950's and 1960's the juvenile court system became the object of
severe criticism and varied programs of reform.' Three of the recommendations
relating to the adjudicatory phase of the process are notable. First, more emphasis
should be placed upon the prehearing procedures in order to encourage settlements without the necessity of going to trial.' Second, the delinquency adjudication should be limited to those who are guilty of some criminal misconduct. A
new designation being reserved for the remainder of persons now coming under
the general classification of "delinquent." 2 Third, the adjudicatory hearing
should be clearly distinct from the dispositive stage procedurally and should
possess different rules of evidence. 2' One effect of these proposed reforms would
be to increase the criminal nature of the delinquency proceeding and declaration
by removing the non-criminal and uncontested cases from this type of hearing
and adjudication.
11 Id. at 109.
12 Pee v.United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C.Cir. 1959). The cases cited in the appendix
of this opinion survey decisions in every state supporting this position.
13 State v. Thomasson, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463 (1955).
14 Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 P. 718 (1928).
15 Monk v. State, 238 Miss. 658, 116 So. 2d 810 (1960).
16 In re Diaz, 211 La. 1015, 31 So. 2d 195 (1947).
17 Commonwealth v.Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198, 200 '(1905).
18 E.g.. P.TAPPEN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, Part III (1949); Paulsen, Fairness to the
Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L.REV.547 (1956); Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile
Court, 60 N. U. L.REv. 585 (1965); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System:
Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7; Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The
Constitutional Context of the Juvenile Cases, 1966 S.Ct. REv. 167.
19

THE

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JusTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 81-82 (1967).
20 E.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
21 E.g., UNIFORM JUVENILE CT. ACT (1968).
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The United States Supreme Court took its first cautious step towards a full
evaluation of the constitutionality of the juvenile court procedures in the case
of Kent v. United States.2 Kent, sixteen years of age at the time of his trial, was
accused of robbery and rape. Under the statutes of the District of Columbia,
the juvenile court has original jurisdiction over all persons less than eighteen
years of age who are accused of a crime unless jurisdiction is waived by the court.
The statute requires that a waiver be made only after a "full investigation." In
the event of a waiver the case is removed to the criminal court for trial." Kent's
appointed attorney requested a hearing on this matter but his request was denied
by the trial judge on the grounds that it was not required under the statute. The
judge thereafter announced his decision to waive the juvenile court jurisdiction
after a "full investigation."24 The Supreme Court reversed holding that the
hearing was required within the meaning of the statute.
The holding of the Supreme Court was limited to the statutory construction
but the opinion showed clear indications that the Court was not yet finished
looking into the juvenile court procedures:
They also suggest basic issues as to the justifiability of affording a juvenile less
protection than is accorded adults .. .particularly where, as here, there is
an absence of any indication that the denial of rights available to adults
was offset, mitigated or explained by actions of the government,
as parens
5
patriae, evidencing.., special solicitude for juveniles.2
Although the Court did not delve deeply into the constitutional issues it did
make certain significant references with regard to the due process requirements
in the waiver hearings:
We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, or even the usual administrative hearing, but we do hold that the hearings
must measure up to the
26
essentials of due process and fair treatment.
The constitutional questions were squarely before the Court in two subsequent cases, In re Gault" and In re Winship.2" Gault concerned a youth who
was adjudged to be delinquent based upon a finding that he and another youth
made lewd telephone calls. The delinquency petition bringing him before the
juvenile court alleged only the legal conclusion that he was a delinquent and in
need of supervision. The court did not inform him of his rights to be represented
by counsel during the critical phases of the proceedings, to refrain from incriminating himself and to confront the witnesses against him. After the adjudication Gault was allowed neither a direct appeal nor a transcript of the hearing. 9 The United States Supreme Court reversed this finding holding that a
22
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383 U.S. 541 (1966).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914, now § 11-1553 (Supp. iv, 1965).
383 U.S. at 546.
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387 U.S. 1 (1967).
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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juvenile in a state delinquency proceeding is entitled to the rights to counsel, 0 to
confront and cross-examine witnesses,31 to the privilege against self-incriminaThe Court expressly
tion,"2 and to the right to adequate notice of charges.
declined to to determine whether the juvenile was entitled to direct appeal and
to a transcript.3 '
In the second case, Samuel Winship was accused of theft in a delinquency
petition. The trial judge, after hearing all of the evidence, declared Samuel to
be delinquent based upon a finding that he stole the money in question. He admitted, under questioning by the attorney for Winship, that his decision was
based on a preponderance of the evidence in accordance with New York law."5
The Supreme Court rejected the preponderance standard and held that for the
limited purpose of determining the quantum of evidence necessary to declare a
youth delinquent based on criminal misconduct, the proceedings may be considered criminal in nature and the reasonable doubt standard employed."
The traditional justifications used in the early constitutional challenges in
the state courts were the first points discussed in Gault and Winship. The benefits which a youth is said to receive in the juvenile courts have played a significant
role in the perpetuation of the constitutional immunity of the system.3" Mr.
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority in Gault, was, however, unimpressed by
similar contentions. First, the "industrial school" is a euphemistic title for an
institution for confinement 8 Second, the nonpublic nature of the proceedings
and dispositions is sufficiently disregarded in practice to ignore it as a significant
factor. "9 Third, the designation of delinquency as non-criminal, while not always
so held by the general public, need not be affected by the addition of the procedural rights. 0 Finally, it is not necessary to impair the picture of the juvenile
judge as a benevolent father figure. 4' The Court further noted that the good intentions of the state in administering the juvenile court system would not suffice
to replace the due process rights.4 2 The Gault court stated that the "Juvenile
Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."" 3
Finally, the Court noted that the "civil" label would no longer be sufficient to
circumvent the constitutional questions. 4
The Court made it clear that in the juvenile as well as in the adult courts,
due process procedures were to be employed in order to circumscribe the use of
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Id. at 41.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 57-58.
N.Y. FAMILY COURT AcT § 744'(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
397 U.S. at 368.
In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
387 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24 n. 31.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 18.
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governmental power for the purpose of depriving one of his liberty.4" Mr. Justice
Fortas, in his opinion for the majority in Gault, stated that:
Due process of laws is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual
freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which
defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state
may exercise."
Although the Court was faced with a broad-based attack upon the juvenile
system, it was not yet ready to terminate the experiment. Therefore, the opinions
were extremely limited in their potential application:
We do not ... consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon
the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state.... We consider
only the problems presented by this case. These relate to the proceedings by
which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent"
as a result of alleged misconduct on his 47part, with the consequence that he
may be committed to a state institution.
The opinions were further limited in their scope by their citation to Kent which
held that the hearing need not necessarily conform to the due process standards
of adult proceedings.48 There is, in addition, some indication in both of these
opinions that the Court was troubled by the possibility that the addition of
certain rights might so alter the nature of the proceedings that they would be
valueless." The Court offered neither examples of situations in which this might
be a factor nor any clear indication of the result it would prefer.
The Court then turned to the task of applying the due process rights in
question to the juvenile courts. The standard used was that of fair treatment
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." In each instance,
the fact that a protection in question was required in an adult court was not
determinative of the ultimate issue." The Court, in applying this due process
test, reveals a fundamental ambiguity as to the exact meaning of the standard.
The rights discussed in Gault and Winship were found to protect the same
interests, to serve the same purposes and to apply to the same extent as the corresponding right in the criminal courts; yet the same constitutional justification,
to wit: the provisions of the Bill of Rights, was never invoked. For example, the
sixth amendment right to counsel was made applicable to the state criminal courts
through the operation of the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainright.52
In Gault, the Court determined that:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law,
45 397 U.S. at 363.
46 387 U.S. at 20.
47 Id. at 13; see 397 U.S. 359 n.1.
48 387 U.S. at 30, citing 383 U.S. at 562.
49 Id. at 21; 397 U.S. at 365-67.
50 387 U.S. at 30; 397 U.S. 359.
51 387 U.S. at 30; 397 U.S. at 359.
52 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the
5
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to submit it. 3
These are the same basic reasons the Court used in Gideon.54 The Gault decision
did not rely on Gideon but instead relied on the earlier case of Powell v.
Alabama." The Powell decision was decided on the basis of the fourteenth
amendment alone;5" the Bill of Rights provision playing no part. The Court
concluded that the right to counsel is just as necessary to protect the alleged
juvenile offender as to protect an adult defendant and is applicable to the same
extent.5'
In Winship, the rationale of the Court is similarly obfuscated. The Court
here held that a defendant in a state criminal trial may be found guilty only
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Justices found that the reasonable
doubt standard is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of reversal for factual
error, 8 giving substance to the presumption of innocence59 and in general impressing the trier of the facts with the "necessity of reaching a subjective state of
certitude" on the factual questions.6 " The Court then held that the "same considerations that demand extreme caution in fact finding to protect the innocent
adult apply as well to the innocent child.""' The reasonable doubt standard was
then applied to the juvenile courts to provide the youthful offender with the
same protections afforded the adult criminal.62 The Court made no attempt to
delineate the relationship between the applicability of the adult right and the
youth right. It is clear from these examples that the standards employed in Gault
and Winship are of little aid in any attempt to articulate the constitutional
criteria by which the "fundamental fairness" of the juvenile courts is to be
measured.
There were two significant separate opinions in these cases. In Gault Mr.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in part, voiced the fear that perhaps the Court was
moving too rapidly in its efforts to restrict the juvenile courts with procedural
formality so as to inhibit the development by the state legislatures of alternative
safeguards.63 More fundamentally, he felt that the major issue before the Court
was whether the proceedings authorized by the Arizona constitution met the
standards of the due process clause, not whether a particular procedure required
in the criminal courts was necessary in the delinquency hearings. 4
In Winship, Mr. Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Mr. Justice White concurred. The Chief Justice believed that the Court was
being influenced more by the failures in the dispositional phase than with any
53
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387 U.S. at 36.
372 U.S. at 344.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Id. at 71.
387 U.S. at 41.
397 U.S. at 363.
Id.
Id. at 364, citing Dorsen and Rezneck; In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law,
L. Q. No. 4, 1, 26 (1967).
397 U.S. at 365.
Id. at 368.
387 U.S. at 76 '(Harlan, J. dissenting in part).
Id. at 67.
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real deprivation of due process rights.65 He went on to say that he could "see no
constitutional requirement . . . to overcome the legislative judgement of the
States."66 These two opinions are quite important in that they indicate the
strong hold that the more traditional approach towards the juvenile courts still
maintained on the Court. In addition, Winship was decided by a four-to-three
vote with one vacancy on the bench. The tenuousness of the advances made in
the two cases is self-evident.
Implicit in Gault and Winship is the requirement that before a right is
applied to the juvenile courts it must first be determined to be necessary for a
valid state criminal trial. When Gault was decided the right to a trial by jury
had not yet been applied to state proceedings, in fact dictum in Palko v. Connecticu' 7 indicated that the right was not applicable.66 Duncan v. Louisiana69
remedied this however.
In theory, the jury is not as essential to an adversary system as is, for example, the right to counsel. The Court noted in Duncan that it is easy to imagine a legal system in which the jury plays no part but which is perfectly fair
in terms of our due process requirements."0 Many of our quasi-judicial fact-finding boards provide excellent examples of the workability of such systems. In addition, petty crimes do not come within the scope of the jury right in the federal
courts.71 Mr. Justice Fortas' majority opinion in Duncan concluded that the
right is within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. 2 There are certain
positive functions which the jury serves such as involving the community in the
judical process, mitigating the harshness of the law in light of local values and
buffering the defendant from arbitrariness on the part of the judge or prosecutor
which weigh in favor of applying the right.7 In dictum, the Supreme Court clearly felt that due process questions should not be determined solely in terms of the
actual fairness of a system of criminal justice devised by a state. Rather, the
proceeding must be measured against the standards of due process, including the
procedural elements, of the Anglo-American common-law experience.74
75
and Williams v.
The Duncan holding was widened in Bloom v. Illinois
6
Florida. In Bloom, the defendant was imprisoned for criminal contempt. The
jury right had traditionally been denied in these cases on two grounds: first,
it is not a serious crime 7 and second, it is necessary to uphold the integrity of
In this decision the Court held that neither of these justifications
the court.'
would be sufficient of itself to overcome the basic constitutional question of a
denial of due process. The Court concluded that in any proceeding in which
65
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397 U.S. at 376.
Id.
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 150 n.14.
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the defendant charged with an offense having all of the indicia of a crime and
involving the possibility of an extended prison term the constitutional right is operative."9 In Williams the necessity of having a jury of twelve men was considered. In its decision to affirm, the Court found that twelve is an arbitrary
number and the benefits of the jury system would not be affected by a panel
containing a lesser number. The Court did say that there was conceivably a
minimum number required but declined to speculate as to what this might be."
The right to a jury trial in a delinquency proceeding was in issue in numerous cases following Gault and Duncan.8 There were only two instances, however,
in which the right was granted, Nieves v. United States8 2 and Peyton v. Nord."
In neither of these cases was the issue as formulated in Gault and Winship, that
is whether a particular right is required in the juvenile courts under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, squarely before the court. They are
therefore of little aid in analyzing the effects of the two Supreme Court decisions.
The decisions in which the right was denied, although more explicitly addressed to the specific constitutional issue, seemed to ignore much of the rationale
of Gault and Winship. One justification utilized was the criminal-non-criminal
dichotomy repudiated in Gault.84 Another interpreted the decision narrowly,
applying the right only if the hearing could not be fair without it.85 The more
carefully reasoned opinions required that a "judicious balance" be struck between
the desirability of maintaining the benefits "inherent" in the informal, flexible
hearings against the protections accruing to the youth from the operation of the
due process rights.8" These state courts did not consider, however, the more
fundamental elements as the general role of due process or the specific functions
of the right in question. In sum, these decisions indicate that the state courts
retained their traditional reluctance to look into, or tamper with, the juvenile
court processes despite the decisions in Gault and Winship to the contrary.
It was against this background that the Supreme Court decided the issue
of whether the jury is a necessary element in a delinquency proceeding. 7 The
opinion in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania differed significantly in its approach to the
problem from that taken in Gault and Winship. These differences centered on
two areas: first, the McKeiver decision did not limit its primary concern to the
adjudicatory proceedings as was done previously and second, the Court adopted
a more restrictive view of the role of due process in the juvenile courts.
As was discussed above, the Supreme Court explicitly limited the holdings
in Gault and Winship to the precise issues presented, that is to the application
79 Id. at 208.
80

Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.

81

A list of decisions dealing with this question after Gault is compiled at 403 U.S. at 549.

82 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
83 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968).

84 E.g., in re Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 169 N.W.2d 431 (1969).
85 Terry Appeal, 438 Pa. 339, 348, 265 A.2d 350, 354 (1970).
86 In re Agler, 18 Ohio St. 2d 70. 79, 249 N.E.2d 808, 813-14 (1969); In re D., 27

N.Y.2d 90, 92, 261 N.E.2d 627, 629 (1970).

87 The issue was first presented to the Court in DeBacker v. Brainard,396 U.S. 28 (1969).
However the Court did not feel that this was a proper case in which to resolve the question
as the hearing took place prior to that in Duncan and was therefore within the holding of
DeStephano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 '(1968) which did not give retroactive application to
Duncan.
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of specific rights to the adjudicative stage of the proceedings.88 The portions of
these opinions referring to the failure of the system to live up to its high expectations justified the break with the traditional judicial unwillingness to look into
the constitutionality of the juvenile system.8 9 These considerations played no part
in the determination of the specific question of the applicability of the rights. If
we look to McKeiver the focus of the opinion widens to consider the intake,
adjudicatory, and dispositi6nal processes as interrelated in determining applicability of the jury right. The plurality opinion was fearful that:
The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would .. .
provide an attrition of the juvenile courts assumed ability to function in a
unique manner. It would not remedy the defects of the system. Meager as
has been the hoped for advance in the juvenile courts, the alternative would
be regessive ... and would tend once again to place the juvenile squarely
in the routine of the criminal process. 0°
The Court went on to say that it did not consider the failures to be of constitutional consequence at this time. 9 Further the Court took the position that to
impose the jury right necessarily equated the adjudicatory hearing with a criminal
trial."2 This approach is also not well supported by the authorities cited. The
Task Force Report, it was noted, failed to recommend the use of juries in its
list of reforms and expressly recommended "against abandonment of the system
and against the return of the juvenile to the criminal courts." 3 The relevant
portions of the pertinent passages from the Report read as follows:
.. . and remand the disposition of children charged with crime to the
criminal courts of the country . . . What should distinguish the juvenile

from the criminal courts is the greater emphasis on rehabilitation, not exclusive preoccupation with it."'
The McKeiver Court took a narrow view of what was done in Gault and
Winship. There was no question as to the appropriate due process standard, as
"fundamental fairness" had been established in the earlier cases.95 As developed
in this decision fairness in the fact-finding mechanism should be the chief concern. " There can be no doubt that this was a crucial concern in the preceding
cases, but it is only half of the picture. Gault and Winship applied the rights
to the same extent and for the same reasons as they were required in the adult
court: they were used to regulate the use of governmental power, to protect
certain interests of the juvenile and to insure the reliability of the findings of fact."
Based upon this interpretation of Gault and Winship the question of the
88
89
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necessity of the jury right in the adjudicatory hearing was answered in the negative.98 The Court correctly pointed out that the jury is not the only reliable
method of making factual determinations." The relevance of the other functions
of the jury such as to protect the youth from overzealous prosecution by a corrupt
or politically minded prosecutor or judge and to interject community values into
the determination of criminal guilt or innocence were not discussed.
The concurring opinions of Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Brennan took
issue with the rest of the plurality on this omission. Mr. Justice White's attitude
toward the juvenile court system is very traditional in its approach as he emphasizes more the ideals of the court than the realities of the situation.'
He
was, therefore, willing to consider the intake procedures as sufficient buffers
against abuse.'
Although there is nothing in the facts presented to indicate
that political considerations were the primary motives of the arresting officers in
this case, the fact remains that the North Carolina youths were arrested for
It is remarkable that Mr. Justice
conduct growing out of political activities.'
White could see little "temptation to use the courts for political ends.""'
Mr. Justice Brennan was more concerned with possible oppression in the
system.'
He was satisfied, however, that the juvenile could be adequately
protected by an open trial:
An accused may in essence appeal to the community at large, by focusing
the public attention upon the facts of the trial, exposing improper judical
behavior to public view, and obtaining if necessary executive redress through
the medium of public indignation.10 5
The Justice would prefer to have the juvenile waive his right to a relatively secret
trial and disposition and carry his case to the people. A public trial alone might
be effective to deter judges or other court officers who are tempted towards more
flagrant abuses, but it is difficult to see how this could counter the more subtle
forms of bias or interject the sympathy of the community in the decisions of the
court.
Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the plurality in the present case also
found the jury right to be somewhat less fundamental than the rights dealt with in
Gault and Winship. He based this in part upon the following quote from
Duncan: "We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial-or any
particular trial-held before a judge is unfair
.
... MO' The Duncan Court was
referring specifically to the fact that waivers are allowed in criminal trials and
that a jury need not be supplied to try petty cases."0 7 The issue in McKeiver was
not whether a trial after a waiver of the jury right is valid, but whether a request
for such a trial may be constitutionally denied. In this respect the jury is no
98 403 U.S. at 545.
99 Id. at 543.

100 Id. at 551-552 (White, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 552.
102 Id. at 536.
103 Id. at 552.
104 Id. at 553 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

105 Id. at 555.
106
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different from the other due process rights previously discussed by the Court.
The petty crime exception is also irrelevant as a delinquency adjudication is
clearly serious. Dictum in Gault recognized that any indeterminant commitment
to an "industrial school" was for a minimum of three years,"'8 far in excess of the
two-year sentence in Bloom." 9 A second point emphasized by Mr. Justice
Blackmun was that Duncan was given only prospective application in DeStephano
v.Woods. 1 In DeStephano three factors, "(1) the purpose to be served by the
new standard, (2) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on
the old standards and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards" were balanced in reaching the decision."' Thus, the fundamentalness of the right was only one of three interrelated factors taken into account by the Court. The final case cited to support
the contention that the jury is less fundamental was Williams v. Florida. The
Court permitted a jury to contain less than twelve men. The opinion was careful
to point out that it was not in any way watering down the right, rather it was
providing a measure of flexibility to the states to ease the burden of meeting
their constitutional obligations." 2 In sum, the holdings in Duncan and the cases
which followed clearly require that a jury be provided on demand in a serious
state criminal trial, and nothing less.
Due to the formulation of the issue by the Court the question of the effects
of the jury upon the adjudicatory proceeding received scant attention."' The
chief concern was whether the hearing would be turned into an adversary proceeding." 4 In light of Gault this appears to be almost a moot point. The addition of the rights to counsel, to cross-examination and to confrontation has
probably done more than the jury could do to make it in to an adversary situation. Furthermore, the Court in Gault was not persuaded by this fear, suggesting
that while some benefit may be afforded a juvenile by a flexible and informal
procedure some "due process requirements will . . . [nonetheless] introduce a
degree of order and regularity... and in contested cases will introduce some of
the elements of the adversary system.""' 5 In McKeiver the Court also mentioned,
but did not discuss the most serious argument against the use of the jury in the
juvenile courts, that is the problem of increased delay."'
In this decision the Supreme Court has, at best, temporarily halted the
trend of the Court to afford juveniles the rights to which all citizens are entitled, and at worst, a major step backwards has been taken. The failure to
reverse the decisions of the state supreme courts is in and of itself unfortunate.
The principles set forth in Duncan, Gault and Winship provided an ample basis
for such a decision and would have been another step towards removing children
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from the category of constitutional non-persons 17 The Court did not completely
close the door to a future evaluation of the question of juvenile rights however, "8
and one may hope that McKeiver is but a brief departure from the Gault and
Winship trend.
The Court may here have taken a step backwards to the pre-Gault
decisions. Gault and Winship stand for, at least, the principle that the Court will
not yield to the rhetoric traditionally surrounding the juvenile court system. The
Court was cognizant of the possible benefits of the system in the earlier cases
but would not permit the state to interfere in the affairs of a youthful offender
umless the precepts of due process were adhered to.'19 As noted above, the influence of the traditional evaluation of the system is evident throughout
McKeiver. The different results of these two approaches are illustrated in the
following hypothetical. A juvenile is arrested for possession of a non-addictive,
but illegal, drug. The sole evidence presented in support of the delinquency
petition is the drug which was obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure. If the Gault approach is taken the violation of the youth's rights could
arguably outweigh any interest of the state in "saving the child." If the McKeiver
view is utilized there can be little doubt that the evidence would be admissible
and the youth adjudged a delinquent. The Court was not required to apply the
jury right to these proceedings by Gault. The ambiguity of the standard coupled
with a balancing of the benefits gained and lost by the addition of the jury could
have reasonably resulted in the same decision.
Dictum in the present case indicates that McKeiver may have further implications outside of the juvenile rights field. Mr. Justice Blackmun stated that:
In this field, as in so many others, one perhaps learns best by doing. We are
reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further and to seek in new and
different ways the elusive answers to the problems of the young, and we feel
that we
would be impeding that experimentation by imposing the jury
20
trial.

This position is similar to that taken by the Chief Justice in Winship. He was
there of the opinion that the legislative judgement of the state outweighed any
constitutional issues present. 1 It is too early to fairly judge what effect the
first two appointments by President Nixon will have on the future expansion of
individual rights. The opinions expressed in McKeiver and the Winship dissent
indicate that they will be willing to eschew the leadership role played by the
Court during the last fifteen years.
This decision is unfortunate. It rests upon questionable distinctions in
previous cases and equally questionable rhetoric. The conclusions drawn are
basically those rejected in the earlier cases and as a result the usefulness of the
leading cases in the juvenile rights field has been severely circumscribed. Unless
117 Fortas, Equal Rights for Whom? 42 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 401 (1967).
118 403 U.S. at 551.
119 Cases cited note 62 supra.
120 403 U.S. at 547.
121 397 U.S. at 376.
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the Court sees fit to reevaluate the position it adopted here, one must conclude
that McKeiver v. Pennsylvania marks the drawing to a close of the "Children's
Hour" in the Supreme Court.
Paul V. Reagan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CRIMINAL LAW WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
AUTOMOBILE AT POLICE STATION HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVEN THOUGH
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED, DESPITE RULING IN

CHAMBERS V. MARONEY. -

Edward Coolidge was arrested at his home for the murder of Pamela Mason.
The automobile parked in defendant's driveway was subsequently towed to the
police station and searched two days later, and again on two occasions during
the following year. Vacuum sweepings, including particles of gunpowder, were
introduced as part of the state's evidence in its attempt to show that Miss Mason
had been in Coolidge's car on the night of the murder.
Coolidge was convicted of first degree murder by the Superior Court of Hillsborough, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed.' Relying upon
Cooper v. California,2 the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the search,
and stated that since the automobile had been properly impounded as an instrumentality of the crime, investigating officers could properly seize whatever evidence was found therein. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
and in considering the validity of the police station search, reversed and held: a
warrantless search of an automobile at the police station is invalid when no exigency exists, despite a strong showing of probable cause as to the automobile.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
The Supreme Court, in so holding, has deviated from its previous decisions
in which it had indicated that due to an automobile's inherent mobility, a warrantless search at the police station was reasonable where probable cause existed.
In Chambers v. Maroney,8 the Supreme Court held that an automobile could
be searched without a warrant if probable cause existed for the search, even
though it was practical to obtain a warrant and the search was not justified as
4
incident to an arrest.
The Supreme Court in Coolidge has thus significantly undermined the
Chambers decision and breathed new vitality into the "automobile exception"
principle. This principle, which originated in Carroll v. United States,5 had been
so extended by recent Supreme Court opinions as to significantly dilute the fourth
amendment right to privacy when an automobile was involved, giving the individual in effect a secondhand citizenship.'
In Carroll v. United States,' a contemporaneous search of an automobile
was permitted even though it was not incident to an arrest and despite the absence
1
2
3

State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969).
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
4 Comment, 46 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 610, 611 (1971).
5 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
6 Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amendment Standards: The Warrantless Search, 45 CONN. B.J. 2, 31 (1971).
7 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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of a search warrant when it was stopped on the highway. The Supreme Court
related that due to the mobility of the automobile and the occupants having been
alerted by the police, an exigency existed which made obtaining a warrant impractical. The focus of this "moving vehicle" exception was on the possible removal or destruction of evidence. If the officers had taken time to obtain the
warrant, the contraband liquor would have been removed or the automobile
driven out of the jurisdiction. The automobile was, practically speaking, a "fleeting target."
The Carroll principle in later decisions was so expanded as to lose sight of
its original justification-exigency resulting from mobility. In Cooper v. California,' the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search at the police station,
despite the lack of an exigency, solely on the ground of "reasonableness." Cooper
had been arrested for selling narcotics and his automobile impounded under a
state statute in connection with the offense. While his automobile was in police
custody pending forfeiture proceedings, a warrantless search was conducted which
disclosed narcotics. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
search despite the practicability of obtaining a warrant. The Court said that it
would have been unreasonable for the police to hold the automobile for the four
months' duration without being able to search it for their own protection. The
Court, relying upon United States v. Rabinowitz,' stated that the relevant test
was whether the search was reasonable, not whether it was reasonable to procure
a search warrant.1"
In United States v. Preston," a case decided three years earlier, the Supreme
Court invalidated a warrantless search at the police station because it was clearly
too remote to have been incident to an arrest and not within the Carroll exception
since the automobile was properly in police custody and not likely to be moved out
of the jurisdiction. The Court in Cooper distinguished Preston on two grounds.
The Court noted that in Preston the search was not related to the offense charged
(vagrancy), while in Cooper, the search was related to the narcotics charge.
Also, in Cooper there was a statute authorizing the seizure of the automobile,
while no such statute existed in the Preston case.
These factual distinctions are very unconvincing. The reasoning of Preston
appears to have been equally applicable to Cooper whether or not the search was
related to the offense charged, since Cooperwas not based on a warrantless search
incident to an arrest. In both cases the possibility that evidence would be destroyed once the defendant was arrested and taken into custody was remote.1 2
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Cooper, expressed his belief
that Preston was on "all fours" with Cooper. 3 The similarity between these
two cases as to determinative factors is significant. In both cases the automobiles
were being "validly held," the temporal and spatial relations of arrest and search
were about the same,, there was time for a warrant, and in addition, it appears
8
9

386 U.S. 58 (1967).
339 U.S. 56 (1950).

11

376 U.S. 364 (1964).

13

386 U.S. at 62 (dissenting opinion).

10 386 U.S. at 61-62.
12 Comment, 52

MINN.

L. Rv. 538 (1971).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February, 1972]

that in both cases there was probable cause as to the autombile. The Supreme
Court in Preston assumed that there was probable cause to believe that the automobile was stolen, 4 while in Cooper there was probable cause to search the car
for narcotics. The existence of the statute authorizing seizure did not materially
distinguish the cases because it did not authorize any search, although it could
be argued that it altered the nature of the proceedings, which was against the
automobile rather than against the arrestee. But this would be putting form
before substance, for the stake of privacy is equally as great.
Cooper thus appears to be inconsistent with Preston in holding that where
an automobile is validly within the custody of the police at the station and probable cause exists, a search may be conducted without a warrant despite the lack
of any existing urgency.
The Preston approach was subsequently reaffirmed in Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co.'5 in which the Court held that reasons thought sufficient to justify a
warrantless search no longer persist when the accused is in the custody of the
police and his automobile is parked outside the station.'
With Chimel v. California7 and the rejection of the "reasonable test" in
justifying searches incident to an arrest, it appeared that Cooper had lost its vitality. Chimel emphasized that warrantless searches could only be justified by
the necessities of the situation and the scope of a warrantless search was limited
by its initial justification. Chimel, on this basis, limited a search incident to an
arrest to the area from which the arrestee could obtain weapons or destroy evidence. The Court, clearly recognizing the fourth amendment's mandate of acquiring a warrant, echoed the principles articulated in Katz v.United States that
. ..searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' 8 (Footnotes omitted.)
The Chimel decision was looked upon by some authorities as a "potential
roadblock to vehicle searches."' 9 This notion was quickly dispelled by the Court
2
in Chambers v.Maroney.
In Chambers the police stopped an automobile on
probable cause to believe that the occupants were involved in an armed robbery.
The automobile was driven to the police station where a subsequent search without a warrant revealed two weapons and other fruits of the crime. The police
had probable cause to believe that the auto contained weapons and stolen money
at the time it was stopped.
In support of the taking of the auto into custody and driving it to the police
station, the Supreme Court announced:
14 Annot., Warrantless Search of Automobile, 26 L. Ed. 2d 893, 907 n.7 (1971); Williams
v. United States, 412 F.2d 729, 735 (1969).
15 391 U.S, 216 (1968).
16 23 VAND. L. Rav. 1370, 1373 (1970).
17 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
18 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).

19 Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 626 (1970).
20 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand
seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate 2and
on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without
1
a warrant.

The Supreme Court went on to justify the warrantless police station search on
the grounds that while at the station both the probable cause and mobility factors continued, and an immediate search was no greater an intrusion than a
temporary immobilization. The Supreme Court thus was willing to permit a
warrantless search either on the highway or at the station. The highway search
falls neatly into the "automobile exception" principle because of the substantial
risk of the auto leaving the jurisdiction. This same justification is apparently
absent when the automobile is in custody at the station, unless there is some presumption to be drawn from the inherent mobility of an automobile. A realistic
approach to the situation would have revealed no great danger of any removal
or destruction of evidence. Strict adherence to the Carroll doctrine would have
conditioned a valid search on the obtaining of a warrant. It is not enough to
invoke Carrollthat an automobile has potential for mobility where that potential
does not create an exigency. The "continuing mobility" the Supreme Court refers to in Chambers,22 when the auto was in custody at the police station, was a
significant departure from the mobility standard espoused in Carroll. The auto,
under the circumstances, could hardly have been described as a "fleeting target."
In the language of Preston v. United States,
Nor, since the men were under arrest at the police station and the car was
in police custody at a garage, was there 2any danger that the car would be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction. 3
The Chambers decision is inconsistent with Chimel v. California." Justice
Stewart emphasized in Chimel that a warrant was to be obtained despite the unquestionable existence of probable cause and, relying on Terry v. Ohio,25 pointed
out that the scope of a warrantless search was to be circumscribed by the demands of the situation and not to be freely expanded. This is even more evident
when viewed in light of the fourth amendment's historical origin as a reaction
to a large extent to general warrants. If nothing else, Chimel would seem to
have required a close analysis of the facts to insure that the Carroll doctrine did
apply in Chambers. The fact that an automobile is involved should not automatically justify a warrantless search on probable cause. 8 It can be reasonably
inferred from Chimel that an even greater showing of necessity and urgency is
required than what had previously been exacted due to the weight to be given
warrants in protecting privacy and the desire to strictly limit the scope of war-

rantless activity.
21 Id. at 52.
22 Id.

23 376 U.S. at 368.
24 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
25 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

26 Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 626, 648 (1970).
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Chambers, contrary to the spirit of Chimel, went beyond the necessities of
the situation in expanding the area of warrantless searches. There was no need
to justify a warrantless search when adequate police measures existed to preserve
the existing situation. The police had the authority to temporarily immobilize
the automobile while a warrant was being acquired.
The Supreme Court deviated from recent precedent when it took the position that an immediate warrantless search was for all practical purposes the
same as a temporary immobilization until a magistrate could pass on the issue."
This approach is inconsistent with the Court's repeated stress on adherence to
the judicial process.2" It is analogous to saying that it makes little difference to
the suspect's privacy whether he has a neutral magistrate pass on the issue of
probable cause or whether the police act on their own finding. This loses sight
of the warrant requirement's deterrent effect on illegal police conduct.
Previous "weighing" of the two courses of police conduct by the Court balanced strongly in favor of a temporary immobilization to preserve the status quo.
This is evident in a case decided immediately prior to Chambers. In Vale v.
Louisiana,29 the defendant was arrested outside his house on a narcotics charge.
At that time there was probable cause to believe that the house contained narcotics. A search of the house was too remote to be incident to an arrest. The
Supreme Court, while indicating its approval of a cursory search to determine if
there was anyone in the house who might destroy any incriminating evidence,"0
invalidated the warrantless search of the house. Obviously the limited intrusion
was permissible to dispel any fear of an urgent situation existing by the presence
of someone in the house, and to ascertain whether the status quo would be preserved. Since this interim activity was available and employed, there was no
justification for the immediate warrantless search.
In United States v. Van Leeuwen 1 a strong priority is shown for temporary
immobilization pending a determination of probable cause. The Supreme Court
permitted the "freezing" of a postal package until the existence of probable cause
could be further explored, since there was a reasonable suspicion that the package
was involved in an illegal transaction. After further investigation led to the
establishment of probable cause as to its involvement in an illegal coin transaction, a warrant was obtained and a search conducted. The Supreme Court,
while receptive to the temporary detention, was opposed to an immediate warrantless search.
Terry v. Ohio2 provides another illustration of the Court's willingness to
uphold some temporary measure to sustain the status quo while not permitting an
immediate search. In Terry, the Court permitted officers who had reason to believe "criminal activity was afoot" to make an inquiry, and when they feared for
their personal safety, to make a limited "frisk" of the suspect's outer garments.
While the frisk was permitted, a search of the suspect was not.
27 399 U.S. at 52.
28 389 U.S. at 357.
29 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
30 Id. at 34.
31 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
32 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Terry, Vale, and Van Leeuwen considered together indicate a strong preference for temporary, limited activity aimed at preserving the status quo, while at
the same time, under the same conditions, are opposed to an immediate warrantless search. These decisions are strong support for the proposition that where a
temporary immobilization will suffice to meet the urgency of the situation, police
conduct is to be so confined until a warrant can be obtained.
In Chambers, the temporary seizure of the automobile would have eliminated any existing threat of the destruction of evidence while the issue of probable cause could have been presented to the magistrate.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in Chambers,33 points out that
where probable cause exists to search an automobile there is usually ample reason
to make an arrest. While a person is in custody he could scarcely be inconvenienced by the inability to drive his automobile. In any event, an individual would
most likely prefer a brief loss of the use of the vehicle in exchange for a determination by a magistrate of probable cause. If the suspect would be offended by a
temporary immobilization he could always consent to the immediate search. It
would appear that in light of the fourth amendment's purpose to deter arbitrary
invasions of privacy by government agents, the judgment as to which is least
intrusive shoud be left to the individual, or at least a presumption should be made
in favor of the more limited detention, rather than having an unequivical determination by the Court as to their equivalence.
The Supreme Court in this manner significantly extended the Carroll doctrine as to the area of permissible warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court
validated a warrantless search on probable cause, even where practically speaking a warrant could have been obtained, since the automobile was in police custody and not in the Carroll sense "mobile." The Supreme Court permitted the
search despite the fact that the needs of effective law enforcement could have
sufficiently been satisfied by a limited detention or "seizure" to preserve the existing situation while a warrant was being obtained. This was in direct contrast
to Chimel and its command to restrain the scope of warrantless activity to that
demanded by the existing urgency, and no greater.
The Chambers decision led some authorities to conclude that automobiles
were going to be left altogether out of the requirement of adherence to the judicial process in obtaining a warrant where practical."' The automobile and its
inherent mobility appeared to be sufficient to justify a warrantless search where
probable cause exists.
In the Supreme Court's most recent treatment of the subject, Coolidge u.
New Hampshire, the Supreme Court alleviated fears that an automobile's inherent mobility would automatically justify warrantless police station searches.
The Supreme Court returned to its original concept of mobility with its requirement that conditions be such as to create a danger that the automobile would be
removed or evidence destroyed while the police obtained a search warrant.
In Coolidge, defendant was arrested at his house for murder and his auto33 399 U.S. at 64 *(dissenting opinion).

34 See Comment, 46 NOTRE DAME- LAWYz
1011. 1027 (1971).

610, 615 (1971); Note, 55 MINN. L. Rav.
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mobile was towed to the police station where it was subsequently searched. At
the time of the station search there was probable cause to believe incriminating
evidence might be found, since the testimony of witnesses had connected the automobile with the crime. In Coolidge, to the same extent as in Chambers, the
"mobility" of the car continued while in custody at the police station. The "continuing mobility" the Court referred to in Chambers,35 since equally present in
Coolidge, appeared to require that the search be upheld under the Carroll doctrine. The Supreme Court, however, repudiated the police station search, relying
on the fact that the police had known of the probable role of the automobile for
some time, defendant had ample opportunity to destroy evidence, and he had
been made aware that he was a suspect by previous inquiries; that in short "the
opportunity for search was hardly 'fleeting.' "'I' It is thus evident that although
there is a constitutional difference between a house and an automobile, where the
surrounding circumstances make the automobile in many respects analogous to
a house, no legal distinction for purposes of search can be drawn. The "automobile exception" has no basis for being invoked when an auto's inherent mobility poses no obstacle to obtaining a search warrant.
The Supreme Court did not even bother to consider the station search in
light of the Carroll principle which it had relied on in Chambers37 to justify the
warrantless police station search, despite the fact that probable cause continued
and there was "continuing mobility" to the same extent as it existed in Chambers.
The Supreme Court in Coolidge extremely limited Chambers and gave new
vitality to the Carroll doctrine when it stated: "Since Carroll would not have
justified a warrantless search of the Pontiac at the time Coolidge was arrested, the
later search at the station house was plainly illegal. .... "8 (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court could easily have focused on the situation existing at
the police station at the time of the search and found it almost identical with
Chambers, and justified the warrantless search under Carroll since the automobile was "mobile" and there was probable cause. Instead, Justice Stewart
made it clear that the Chambers rationale would only apply where there was an
initial justifiable intrusion under the "automobile exception," as where an automobile is stopped on the highway containing contraband. The rationale being
that there is little difference between the search on the open highway and a later
search at the station.
Prior to Coolidge, authorities had interpreted Chambers as applying the
Carroll doctrine to the situation existing at the police station and seriously questioning what, if any, actual mobility existed while the automobile was in custody
at the station. 9 It appeared that the Supreme Court had deleted the requirements of Carroll that (1) the automobile be mobile, and (2) a warrant be obtained where practical, when an automobile was validly held at the police sta40
tion.
35
36
37
38
39
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403
399
403
See

U.S. at 52.
U.S. at 460.
U.S. at 52.
U.S. at 463.
Note, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1011, 1026 (1971); Comment, 46 NOTE DA E LAWYER

610, 615 (1971).
40 Comment, 46
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Coolidge puts a new perspective on the question of station searches without
a warrant. The justification comes not because of any exigency existing while
the automobile was in police custody but because of a prior Carroll situation
existing on the highway. The Carroll requirements of mobility and resulting
exigency have not been eroded by Chambers. The suspicion that the same type
of "mobility" existing in Chambers while the automobile was in custody at the
station would be used to justify other warrantless searches in different places has
been laid to rest.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in Coolidge, admitted the lack of any mobility or exigency in Chambers where the police station search was conducted. 1 The requirement of exigency along with mobility to justify a warrantless automobile
search is preserved by Coolidge, but at the same time police acting in such exigency may conduct the search either on the highway or at the police station.
This is at least true when, as in Chambers, a highway search would be under
severe conditions. In Chambers the automobile was stopped in the middle of
the night in a dark parking lot where an immediate search would have been ineffective and possibly dangerous.
The Supreme Court made it clear that where there is no prior Carroll exigency, a warrantless search where the automobile is validly taken to the police
station is a violation of the fourth amendment's requirement of adherence to
the judicial process. While an auto is in custody at the police station there is no
reasonable basis for invoking the "automobile exception." This is true despite
the potential mobility of an automobile.
The Supreme Court relies upon Dyke u. Taylor Implement Company4 2 as
controlling. In Dyke, an automobile originally stopped on the highway was
parked outside the police station as a reasonable police measure to protect the
property of the arrestee. There was no probable cause to search the automobile.
A warrantless search was struck down. In relying on Dyke, the Supreme Court
indicates that the critical factor is not the existence or non-existence of probable
cause but whether or not there is compliance with the warrant requirement.
The Supreme Court in Coolidge has thus severely confined Chambers and
revived the original mobility requirement of Carroll.In light of Coolidge, Cooper
would seem to be limited to situations where there is a proceeding directly against
the automobile, justifying more far-reaching conduct analogous to the control
exerted over an arrested person.
Coolidge is a recognition by the Supreme Court that the fourth amendment
and its warrant requirement is designed to protect people, not places or things.
That protection to the individual's privacy should be no less where an automobile
is involved. Probable cause itself is no longer sufficient to justify a warrantless
search of an automobile at a police station, despite its inherent mobility.
Ronald J. Zadora
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403 U.S. at 463 n.20.

42 403 U.S. at 463.

